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ILLEGAL ENCOURAGEMENT: THE 
FEDERAL STATUTE THAT MAKES IT 
ILLEGAL TO “ENCOURAGE” IMMIGRANTS 
TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES AND 
WHY IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
OVERBROAD 
Abstract: Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) of Title 8 of the United States Code 
makes it illegal to “encourage” an alien to come to or reside in the United 
States. Since that section’s 1986 amendment, the circuits have struggled to 
adopt a consistent definition for “encourage.” Though some circuits have 
adopted a broad definition, the Third Circuit has explicitly taken a different 
route, applying a narrower construction. In addition to these different con-
structions, the two circuits that addressed the potential overbreadth issue of 
this subsection have reached contrary conclusions. This Note argues that this 
provision is facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine. Applying 
the analysis from Brandenburg v. Ohio, this Note first argues that the statute 
regulates protected speech, specifically advocacy speech. The statute’s appli-
cation criminalizes a substantial number of defendants who are engaging in 
this protected speech, and thus the statute is overly broad. Finally, this Note 
suggests that the statute be redrafted by Congress to include stronger words, 
such as “urge” and “facilitate,” and carve out a special exception for immi-
grants with remediable claims. These solutions would bring the statute back 
within the realm of constitutionality. 
INTRODUCTION 
When Lorraine Henderson told her cleaning lady not to visit her family 
in Brazil, she knew she was encouraging her stay in the country illegally.1 
What she did not know was that for her troubles, less than two years later, she 
would become a convicted felon.2 In 2004, Henderson employed Fabiana 
Bitencourt to clean her townhouse approximately every two weeks.3 At the 
time, Henderson was the Boston Area Port Director for the United States Cus-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See United States v. Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D. Mass. 2012) (describing how 
Henderson warned Bitencourt against leaving the country). 
 2 See id. (noting that Henderson discouraged Bitencourt from leaving the country on Septem-
ber 8, 2008); Verdict, Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d 191 (No. 09CR10028), 2010 WL 6465313 
(noting that the date of the verdict was March 22, 2010). 
 3 See Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 195 (describing how Henderson hired Bitencourt). 
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toms and Border Protection.4 When Henderson employed Bitencourt, she was 
unaware that Bitencourt was in the country illegally.5 Upon learning of Biten-
court’s status, Henderson advised her against leaving the country and pursued 
avenues for Bitencourt to adjust her immigration status.6 A coworker advised 
Henderson that it was unlikely Bitencourt could lawfully remain in the United 
States, but Henderson nevertheless continued to employ Bitencourt.7 Unbe-
knownst to Henderson, this action was in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).8 Police arrested Henderson in December of 2008, and 
after a six-day trial she was convicted of violating federal law.9 
Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code (“Subsection 
Four”) provides that it is illegal for a person to “encourage[] or induce[] an 
alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States.”10 If a person violates 
this statute, they are subject to a fine under Title 18, imprisonment for no 
more than five years, or both.11 As evidenced by Henderson’s case, the reach 
of this statutory language is vast.12 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. at 194 (describing how Henderson obtained the position of Boston Area Port Direc-
tor in December 2003). The Customs and Border Protection agency was formed in March 2003 by 
consolidating multiple organizations. CBP Through the Years, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PRO-
TECTION (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/about/history [https://perma.cc/6AUL-Z4T]. In 
December 2003, Henderson was engaged in an extremely competitive process to become the Bos-
ton Area Port Director. Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 194. As Boston Area Port Director, Hen-
derson oversaw approximately twelve ports of entry throughout Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island. Id.; see also CBP Announces New Boston Area Port Director, U.S. CUSTOMS & 
BORDER PROTECTION (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-
announces-new-boston-area-port-director [https://perma.cc/P6LA-PZBV] (noting that the role of 
Boston Area Port Director would include overseeing twelve different ports). 
 5 See Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d. at 195 (indicating when Henderson was explicitly told by a 
co-worker that Bitencourt was in the country illegally). 
 6 See id. at 196–97 (describing how Bitencourt informed Henderson of her status as an illegal 
immigrant, and Henderson conferred with a co-worker to determine remedies for Bitencourt). 
Specifically, Henderson told Bitencourt “if you leave they won’t let you back in,” “you can’t 
leave, don’t leave,” and “once you leave you will never be back.” Id. at 196. 
 7 See id. at 197 (indicating that Henderson discussed Bitencourt’s immigration status with a 
coworker, and after learning about her unlikely chance of success, continued to employ her on a 
bi-weekly basis). 
 8 See id. (describing Henderson’s arrest and conviction). 
 9 See id. (noting Henderson’s trial and conviction). 
 10 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012). 
 11 Id. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii). In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3559, this punishment makes encour-
aging an immigrant to come to the United States a felony, because part of the punishment is more 
than a year imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (2012) (classifying the various levels of felonies 
and misdemeanors, making the distinction between a Class E felony and a Class A misdemeanor 
one-year imprisonment). Given that the punishment classifies this crime as a felony, under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3571(b)(3) a person convicted of a felony may not be fined more than $250,000, meaning that a 
person could be punished with a fine of not more than $250,000. Id. § 571(b)(3). 
 12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (providing the statutory language); Henderson, 857 F. 
Supp. 2d. at 197 (describing Henderson’s conviction). 
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In light of the statute’s vast reach, this Note examines the constitutional 
breadth of Subsection Four.13 Part I of this Note provides a historical over-
view of the statute, and explores Subsection Four’s different interpretations 
by five circuits, as well as the two circuits that have discussed the overbreadth 
of Subsection Four and reached conflicting conclusions.14 Part II introduces 
and examines the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine.15 In applying the 
overbreadth doctrine, Part II recognizes the importance of determining 
whether speech is protected under the First Amendment and applies the 
standard established by Brandenburg v. Ohio.16 Finally, Part III argues that 
Subsection Four is an unconstitutional restriction on protected speech, in vio-
lation of the overbreadth doctrine.17 Part III then argues that although the 
statute should be invalidated, Congress should amend and enact a statute 
serving a similar purpose, albeit within the bounds of the Constitution.18 
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SUBSECTION FOUR AND THE DIFFERENT 
CONSTRUCTIONS BY THE CIRCUITS 
Subsection Four was enacted as part of a larger body of legislation 
called the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1952.19 The statute’s 
language, however, can be traced further back to the early nineteenth centu-
ry.20 Despite its age, the language of the statute has been preserved and left 
intact, undergoing only one significant revision in 1986.21 Though the lan-
guage of Subsection Four is untouched, it has not been unchallenged.22 The 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 19–272 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 19–140 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 141–206 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 147–165 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 204–253 and accompanying text 
 18 See infra notes 256–272 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.163 (1952) 
(identifying the act as one to revise the laws relating to immigration to the United States). 
 20 See BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION LAWS: ACT OF FEBRUARY 5, 1917: RULES 
OF MAY 1, 1917, at 8–10 (1917) (using “encourage” in the text of the Regulating Immigration of 
Aliens to, and Residence of Aliens in the United States Act of February 5, 1917); see also United 
States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (tracing the roots of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324 to §§ 5–7 of the 1917 Immigration Act). 
 21 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 112, 100 Stat. 
3359, 3381–83 (1986) (noting that the Act provides amendments to the Immigration and National-
ity Act). The significant revision to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) was that there was a change in 
the criminal standard. Infra notes 57–63 and accompanying text. 
 22 See United States v. Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2014) (challenging that the evi-
dence was sufficient to show that the defendant encouraged an immigrant to reside in the United 
States); DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing the 
plaintiff’s argument that the defendants were encouraging immigrants to reside in the United 
States); United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009) (challenging a jury instruc-
tion regarding the definition of “encourage”); United States v. He, 245 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 
2001) (questioning a jury instruction regarding the definition of “encourage”); United States v. 
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statue’s primary prohibition is encouraging aliens to remain in the country 
unlawfully, but five circuit courts have recognized that the word “encourage” 
is ambiguous.23 All five have addressed this ambiguity by attempting to de-
fine it, but in spite of the circuits recognizing the need for a definition, there is 
no consensus between all of the circuits on a singular definition.24 The 
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits generally agree on a definition 
for encourage, but the Third Circuit makes a distinct departure.25 In addition 
to challenges to its foundational language, Subsection Four has also been sub-
ject to constitutional challenges.26 Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have 
discussed the constitutional overbreadth of Subsection Four with the Fourth 
Circuit finding it constitutional and the Ninth Circuit finding it unconstitu-
tional.27 
A. The Deep Roots of the Language of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 
Although Subsection Four was first enacted as part of the INA in 1952, 
its language traces its roots to the Immigration Act of 1917.28 The Immigra-
tion Act of 1917 was also known as the Literacy Act, because it instituted a 
literacy test to be administered to aliens before they could enter the country.29 
                                                                                                                           
Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 1992) (approving of the district court’s usage of Black’s Law 
Dictionary to define “encourage”); see also United States v. Yoshida, 303 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (equating “encourage” with “help”). 
 23 See Thum, 749 F.3d at 1147–48 (distinguishing from Yoshida to establish that “encourage” 
required action beyond escorting someone); DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 248 (adopting Black’s Law 
Dictionary’s definition of “encourage”); Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1249 (interpreting “encourage” to 
mean “to help”); He, 245 F.3d at 959–60 (interpreting “encourage” as “to help”); Oloyede, 982 
F.2d at 136–37 (noting the district court’s usage of Black’s Law Dictionary and concluding, based 
on statutory history, that “encourage” can be equated with “help”). 
 24 See Thum, 749 F.3d at 1147–48 (differing from Yoshida to establish that “encourage” re-
quired action beyond escorting someone); DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 248 (adopting Black’s Law 
Dictionary’s definition of “encourage”); Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1249 (construing “encourage” to mean 
“to help” in reliance on various dictionary definitions); Yoshida, 303 F.3d at 1150 (equating “en-
courage” with “help”); He, 245 F.3d at 959–60 (interpreting “encourage” to mean “to help”). 
 25 See DelRio-Mocci, 673 F. 3d at 250 (noting its distinct departure from the interpretation of 
its sister circuits). 
 26 See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 469–85 (9th Cir. 2018) (addressing the 
constitutional overbreadth of Subsection Four); United States v. Anderton, 901 F.3d 278, 282–84 
(5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, No. 18-846, 2019 WL 659880 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019) (addressing the 
constitutional vagueness of Subsection Four); United States v. Tracy, 456 F. App’x 267, 271–72 
(4th Cir. 2011) (addressing both a constitutional overbreadth challenge and a constitutional 
vagueness challenge). 
 27 See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485 (concluding that Subsection Four was unconstitution-
ally overbroad); Tracy, 456 F. App’x at 272 (finding that Subsection Four was constitutional in 
the face of an overbreadth challenge). 
 28 See BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, supra note 20, at 8–10 (using “encourage” in §§ 5–7). 
 29 See id. at 6 (detailing the illiteracy test whereby participants would have to read thirty to 
forty words in their own language); see also JOHN POWELL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERI-
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The bill for the Act did not garner much support until the Immigration Re-
striction League, a group that advocated for more restrictive immigration reg-
ulations, lobbied Congress to implement literacy tests.30 The Immigration 
Restriction League persuaded Congress to pass a bill that included a literacy 
test, but Presidents Grover Cleveland, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow 
Wilson all vetoed the bill.31 When President Wilson vetoed this bill for the 
final time in 1915, he argued that the literacy test would only allow entry to 
those who had already had the opportunity of education.32 The United States, 
Wilson pleaded, was a place where education was an opportunity, not a re-
quirement for entry.33 Despite President Wilson’s objections, Congress over-
rode his veto, and on February 5, 1917, the Act became law.34 
                                                                                                                           
CAN IMMIGRATION 137 (2005) (identifying the Immigration Act of 1917 as commonly referred to 
as the Literacy Act). 
 30 See POWELL, supra note 29, at 137 (noting that there was little support before the Immigra-
tion Restriction League); see also STEVEN G. KOVEN & FRANK GÖTZKE, AMERICAN IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY 130 (2010) (identifying the Immigration Restriction League as a supporter of the 
literacy test). The Immigration Restriction League was founded by five Harvard graduates, and 
consisted of a number of prominent Boston families. See KOVEN & GÖTZKE, supra, at 130 (ex-
plaining that the Immigration Restriction League was founded by five Harvard graduates); POW-
ELL, supra note 29, at 137 (identifying prominent Boston families as part of the Immigration Re-
striction League). In its Constitution, the Immigration Restriction League stated that its purpose 
was not only to promote more restrictive immigration regulations, but also to inspire the public to 
support the exclusion of elements that would be “injurious to our national character.” Immigration 
Restriction League, Constitution of the Immigration Restriction League 1 (c. 1890), http://nrs.
harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL:949025 [https://perma.cc/CW8W-CMTQ]. The Immigration Restriction 
League wanted a literacy test because it wanted to identify this “undesirable” characteristic, since 
it believed illiterate immigrants were unlikely to be successful in the United States. The Case for 
the Literacy Test, UNPOPULAR REV., Jan.–Mar. 1916, reprinted in 66 PUBLICATIONS OF THE IM-
MIGRATION RESTRICTIONS LEAGUE 7 (c. 1915). Further, the Immigration Restriction League 
believed that an uneducated workforce, was more likely to damage the economy than assist it. Id. 
at 159–60. 
 31 See POWELL, supra note 29, at 137 (noting that Presidents Cleveland, Taft, and Wilson 
each vetoed the bill). The bill was brought to near fruition in 1895, 1903, 1912, and 1915, only to 
be vetoed by the sitting president each time it reached his desk. Id. Both Presidents Cleveland and 
Taft identified the primary reason for denying the bill as the literacy test. See S. DOC. NO. 1087 
(1913), as reprinted in 49 CONG. REC. 3156 (providing President Taft’s veto message for what 
would eventually become the Immigration Act of 1917); S. DOC. NO. 185, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., at 
2–3 (1896) (providing President Cleveland’s veto message for what would eventually become the 
Immigration Act of 1917). President Cleveland vetoed a version of the bill that did not contain the 
“encourage” language that can be found in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). See S. DOC. NO. 185 at 
2–3 (including a copy of the bill that was vetoed, which does not have the “encourage” language 
that can be found in §§ 5–7 of the Immigration Act of 1917). 
 32 See H.R. DOC. NO. 1527 (1915), as reprinted in 52 CONG. REC. 2481, 2482 (arguing that 
the literacy test would in effect allow only those who had been taught to read into the country); 
POWELL, supra note 29, at 137 (noting that Wilson vetoed the bill in 1915). 
 33 See H.R. DOC. NO. 1527, 52 CONG. REC. at 2482 (arguing that those who come to the Unit-
ed States come to learn to read instead of already knowing how to read). 
 34 See POWELL, supra note 29, at 137 (noting that Congress overrode President Wilson’s veto 
on February 5, 1917). Due to increasing literacy rates in Southern and Eastern Europe, the literacy 
test was not as effective as originally intended. See Catherine G. Massey, Immigration Quotas and 
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Sections five through seven of the Immigration Act of 1917 are the 
provenance of Subsection Four.35 Section five of the 1917 Act made it illegal 
to encourage, or attempt to encourage any contract worker to come to the 
United States.36 Section six criminalized encouraging, or attempting to en-
courage, an alien to come to the United States through an advertisement for 
employment.37 Finally, under section seven it was illegal for anyone engaged 
in the business of transporting aliens to encourage, or attempt to encourage, 
any alien to come to the United States.38 Though the language of these sub-
sections is not identical to that of Subsection Four, this language marks the 
origin of the words used in the statute.39 
Congress passed Subsection Four as part of the INA in 1952, formally 
codifying the legislation at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).40 The INA was the 
first comprehensive formulation of immigration law in the United States, that 
amalgamated a body of immigration law into one statute that, prior to the 
INA’s passage, had been an assortment of discrete federal statutes.41 Before 
the INA, various pieces of immigration legislation, such as the Immigration 
Act of 1917, would repeal and amend prior statues, but there was no single, 
unified piece of legislation compiling the various statutes.42 President Harry 
Truman initially vetoed the bill, recognizing that although an overhaul to the 
immigration system was necessary, in his opinion the bill perpetuated too 
                                                                                                                           
Immigrant Selection, 60 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 21, 23 (2016) (identifying the rising literacy 
rates in Southern and Eastern Europe as a factor that prevented it from being effective, and noting 
that by 1921 there was an increase in immigrants). The literacy test was eventually replaced by the 
Emergency Immigration Act of May 19, 1921, which enacted a quota system that placed limita-
tions on the number of immigrants from certain regions. See id. (noting that because of the “per-
ceived ineffectiveness” of the literacy test led to the enactment of the Emergency Immigration Act 
of May 19, 1921 to place numerical restrictions on immigration); see also Emergency Immigration 
Act of 1921, Pub L. No. 67-5, § 2(a), 45 Stat. 5, 5 (detailing the quota system). 
 35 See Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1360 (tracing the roots of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 to §§ 5–7 of 
the Immigration Act of 1917). 
 36 BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, supra note 20, at 8. 
 37 Id. at 9. 
 38 Id. at 9–10. 
 39 See Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1360 (tracing the roots of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to 
§§ 5–7 of the Immigration Act of 1917). 
 40 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, § 274, 66 Stat. 163, 228–29 
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012)) (noting that this section was passed on June 27, 1952). 
 41 See Annette M. Toews, Citizenship Considerations in Minnesota Criminal Justice and the 
Supremacy of Federal Immigration Law, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1245, 1266 (1999) (explain-
ing that there had been federal immigration statutes that were expanded around 1800, and that the 
passage of the INA formatted them into one comprehensive statute). 
 42 See id. (noting that immigration statutes were formatted by the INA). The Immigration Act 
of 1917 is an example of this, as the Bureau of Immigration circulated a copy of the statute and 
included a list of immigration statutes that were not repealed by this new legislation. BUREAU OF 
IMMIGRATION, supra note 20, at 79. 
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many of the fundamental flaws in the immigration system.43 The bill upheld 
an immigration quota system that had been established in the 1920s, and 
placed even greater restrictions by limiting the number of visas issued within 
each quota.44 Congress disagreed, and over President Truman’s objections 
that the statute reaffirmed the quota system, overrode the veto and enacted the 
INA on June 27, 1952.45 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) later amended the 
language of Subsection Four, and akin to the passage of the INA, IRCA’s path 
from bill to law was also not a simple one.46 At the time of its passage, Con-
gress’s focus had shifted from restricting immigration generally, to restricting 
those who enter the United States illegally.47 The first draft of IRCA was a 
bipartisan effort, written and presented by Alan Simpson, a Republican from 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See H.R. DOC. NO. 520 (1952), as reprinted in 98 CONG. REC. 8082, 8082–85 (arguing that 
the bill did address some problems with the current immigration system, but was insufficient in 
addressing the predominant problems). In his address, President Truman argued that the predomi-
nant problem was that the bill would perpetuate the racial and national discriminatory impact of 
the current immigration system. See id. 98 CONG. REC. at 8083–84 (arguing that there were racial 
and national barriers that were not being abolished through this bill). President Truman argued 
that the current system gave priority to “Englishmen and Irishmen” and that the proposed system 
did not offer any real solution. See id. 98 CONG. REC. at 8083 (describing how with this bill, cer-
tain members of the North Atlantic Treaty would feel that their people are “less worthy” of immi-
gration). 
 44 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 §§ 201–203 (establishing that the quota sys-
tem would be upheld, and that visas would only be allocated to a portion of that quota); see also 
DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES, THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 
190 (2002) (describing the way the INA placed additional restrictions on the quota system). The 
quota system in the 1920s was first established with the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921, and 
later more permanently established with the Immigration Act of 1924. KOVEN & GÖTZKE, supra 
note 30, at 132; see Massey, supra note 34, at 23 (identifying the immigration law passed in 1921 
as the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921). The Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 capped 
immigration from certain countries at three percent based on the number of people from those 
countries in the 1910 census. KOVEN & GÖTZKE, supra note 30, at 132; see Massey, supra note 
34, at 23 (identifying the immigration law passed in 1921 as the Emergency Immigration Act of 
1921). The Immigration Act of 1924 prohibited immigrants from Asia, and limited immigrants 
from other countries to two percent of the 1890 census. KOVEN & GÖTZKE, supra note 30, at 132. 
 45 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 281–82 (noting that the bill 
passed in the House of Representatives with a two-thirds majority on June 26, 1952, and in the 
Senate with a two-thirds majority on June 27, 1952). In 1952, the language of Subsection Four 
was enacted in section 274 of the INA and codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4). See Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 112, 100 Stat. 3359, 3381–83 (identifying 
the former § 112 of the INA as 8 U.S.C. § 1324). Subsection Four provided that it was illegal for 
any person to “willfully or knowingly encourage[] or induce[], or attempt[] to encourage or in-
duce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States of any alien.” Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 § 274. 
 46 See TICHENOR, supra note 44, at 252–62 (describing the political struggle around IRCA’s 
enactment). 
 47 See id. at 252 (identifying the time right before the first draft of IRCA was proposed as one 
where certain members of Congress were campaigning for a “close the back door and open the 
front” approach to immigration). 
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Wyoming, and Romano Mazzoli, a Democrat from Kentucky.48 The bill 
quickly passed through the Senate, but received opposition in the House from 
a panoply of interested groups, ranging from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
to the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and it ultimate-
ly did not pass in the House.49 As the drafting was bipartisan, so too was its 
opposition: both conservative groups and more liberal groups opposed the bill 
because it placed strict sanctions on employers, and the liberal groups were 
also opposed to the restrictions placed on legal entry.50 
The bill was reintroduced in 1983, and it once again passed quickly 
through the Senate.51 When the bill reached the House for the second time, 
however, it caused such deep rifts within the chamber that Speaker of the 
House, Thomas P. O’Neill, did not even allow it on the floor.52 Adamant to 
pass this legislation Simpson proposed a revised bill in 1985.53 This bill was 
again easily passed through the Senate, but once again faced issues in the 
House.54 This time though, the various factions reached a compromise, and 
thus the final bill imposed limited sanctions on employers and included an 
amnesty program that allowed for certain seasonal agricultural workers to 
become legal permanent residents.55 On November 6, 1986, President Reagan 
signed IRCA into law.56 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. at 243, 253 (identifying Simpson and Mazzoli as the Congressmen who drafted and 
introduced the bill). 
 49 See id. at 253 (observing the various groups who opposed the bill and prevented its pas-
sage). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed it because it identified the plan as “extremely 
costly and unworkable.” Id. On the other hand, the leader of the Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, Antonia Hernandez, said she would “dance with the devil” to see the bill not 
pass. Id. 
 50 See id. at 253–54 (noting that liberal groups also opposed the bill, and implying that con-
servative groups did as well, and that both groups opposed the employer sanctions). 
 51 See id. at 257 (observing when the bill was reintroduced, and that it passed “easily” through 
the Senate). 
 52 See id. at 258 (noting that, over protests, the Speaker did not allow the bill to be discussed, 
and that this in effect killed the bill). The Speaker of the House faced extreme backlash from the 
media for not allowing the bill to come to the floor, as this action was viewed as preventing immi-
gration reform. Id. After this backlash, the Speaker of the House became a supporter of the bill. 
See id. (explaining that in light of media pressure, the Speaker gave his “blessing” for immigration 
reform). 
 53 See id. at 259 (identifying Simpson as “undaunted” by past rejections). 
 54 See id. at 260 (noting that the bill passed through the Senate with only one amendment, but 
required a lot of negotiation and additional amendments before it could pass through the House). 
 55 See id. at 260–61 (explaining the various compromises that were reached in order for the 
bill to pass through the House and during the conference); see also SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, NA-
TIONS OF EMIGRANTS: SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP IN EL SALVADOR AND THE UNIT-
ED STATES 179 (2007) (identifying the two prongs of IRCA to be the employer sanctions and the 
amnesty provisions for seasonal agricultural workers). The sanctions against employers proved to 
be ineffective as employers still employed undocumented workers. Cecelia M. Espenoza, The 
Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IM-
2019] Illegal Encouragement 1213 
IRCA not only enacted new immigration laws, it also amended the 
INA.57 The first draft of IRCA completely eliminated Subsection Four, but its 
final compromised form added it back in shortly before its enactment—albeit 
with several amendments.58 Of these changes, the most significant was the 
removal of the “willfully or knowingly” element replaced with “knowing or 
in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or 
will be in violation of the law.”59 This change thereby lowered the level of the 
mens rea required for the crime.60 “Willfully” requires that the criminal act 
was done deliberately and with knowledge that the act was unlawful.61 In 
contrast, “in reckless disregard of” means that the criminal act was done with 
a conscious disregard of the risk that the defendant was aware of.62 This 
                                                                                                                           
MIGR. L. J. 343, 346–47 (1994); see also TICHENOR, supra note 44, at 262 (noting that the em-
ployer restrictions were limited by administrative and judicial processes). 
 56 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3359, 3445 (recording that the 
act was enacted on November 6, 1986); see also TICHENOR, supra note 44, at 261 (noting that the 
statute was enacted during the Reagan White House). 
 57 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3359, 3359 (stating that one of 
the purposes of the Act was to revise the INA). From the law’s inception, Congress recognized the 
necessity of immigration reform which would require amending the INA. See 131 CONG. REC. 
13,581 (1985) (identifying the bill that would later become IRCA, bill number S. 1200, as a bill 
that would amend the INA). 
 58 See 131 CONG. REC. 13,581 (introducing the bill to Congress on May 23, 1985). On Octo-
ber 9, 1986, the bill was read in full in the House of Representatives and did not contain the lan-
guage of Subsection Four. See 132 CONG. REC. 30,012, 30,012–38 (1986). On October 14, 1986, 
the bill was revised in accordance with the Conference Report, and the revised bill included the 
language of Subsection Four, at that time relabeled as subsection D. See 132 Cong. Rec. 30,880, 
30,887 (1986). Compare Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 112 (making it illegal to 
encourage an alien to “come to, enter, or reside” in the United States “knowing or in reckless 
disregard” that their entry or residence would be “in violation of the law”), with Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 § 274 (making it illegal to “willfully or knowingly” encourage an alien to 
enter in the United States either “directly or indirectly”). One consideration for including Subsec-
tion Four in the bill was because it was a “useful tool in combatting alien smuggling.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 112 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5716. 
 59 Compare Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 112 (making it illegal to encour-
age an alien to come to the United States “knowing or in reckless disregard” that their entry or 
residence would be “in violation of the law”), with Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 274 
(making it illegal to “willfully or knowingly” encourage an alien to enter in the United States). 
Other changes included the addition of “reside,” the removal of “attempt,” and the removal of 
“directly or indirectly.” See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 112 (amending the 
INA). 
 60 See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 n.9 (2007) (identifying the term “will-
fully” in a criminal context to require an intent that the person knew that their action was unlawful 
(citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136–37 (1994))); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994) (explaining that in criminal law, “reckless” is when a person “disregards 
a risk of harm of which he is aware”). 
 61 See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 551 U.S. at 57 n. 9 (citing Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136–37) (identi-
fying the term “willfully” in a criminal context to require an intent that the person knew that their 
action was unlawful). 
 62 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37 (defining that in criminal law, “reckless” is when a person 
“disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware”). 
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change to the statute allowed for a person’s actions to become unlawful at a 
lower level of intent.63 
IRCA’s enactment opened the gates to further immigration reform, and 
the INA, as the flagship legislation, has accordingly been amended many 
times.64 Some of these changes pertain to 8 U.S.C. § 1324—for instance, in 
1996 with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).65 IIRIRA was an extensive piece of leg-
islation that took a more restrictive approach to immigration law, changing 
immigration procedures for both practitioners and aliens.66 Despite the turbu-
lent nature of the INA and immigration law overall, Subsection Four remains 
untouched.67 
Though untouched, the language of Subsection Four is not unchal-
lenged.68 The language of Subsection Four makes it illegal to “encourage[] or 
induce[] an alien to come to, to enter, or reside in the United States, knowing 
or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry or residence is 
or will be in violation of the law.”69 One issue with this language pays little 
attention to the alien party, and draws no distinction between those who come 
to the country illegally, but are eligible for some type of legal remedy, and 
those who have no remedy for their immigration cases.70 But the greater de-
                                                                                                                           
 63 Compare Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 551 U.S. at 57 n.9 (2007) (citing Ratzlaf 510 U.S. at 
136–37) (noting that the term “willfully” in a criminal context requires an intent that the person 
knew that their action was illegal and includes an additional “bad purpose”), with Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 836–37 (discussing how in criminal law, “reckless” is when a person “disregards a risk of 
harm of which he is aware.”). 
 64 See Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 109-97, § 796, 119 Stat. 2120, 2165 (2005) (amending § 274 of 
the INA to include an exception for religious organizations); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, § 5401, 118 Stat. 3683, 3737 (amending various parts of 
8 U.S.C. § 1324); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
104-208, § 203, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-565 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) to increase penalties). 
 65 See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 
Stat. 3009, 3009-569 to -575 (providing miscellaneous amendments to the INA in subtitle B). 
 66 See SHANE DIZON & NADINE K. WETTSTEIN, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 1:28 (2d ed. 
2019) (identifying IIRIRA as a massive and complex piece of legislation that altered immigration 
for attorneys and aliens alike). 
 67 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (making it illegal to encourage an alien to “come to, 
enter, or reside” in the United States “knowing or in reckless disregard” that their entry or resi-
dence would be “in violation of the law”), with Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
§ 112 (making it illegal to encourage an alien to “come to, enter, or reside” in the United States 
“knowing or in reckless disregard” that their entry or residence would be “in violation of the 
law”). 
 68 See Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1248 (appealing based on the definition provided to the jury by the 
lower court for the word “encourage”); He, 245 F.3d at 958 (bringing an appeal based on the defi-
nition provided to the jury by the lower court for the word “encourage”). 
 69 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
 70 See id. (focusing on the actions of the perpetrator while not providing a definition for alien 
in the subsection); see also Brief for Amici Curiae Oregon Interfaith Movement for Immigrant 
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bate, is that the term “encourage” appears to be ambiguous, compelling the 
Fourth, Seventh, Eleventh, Third, and Ninth circuits to supply a definition for 
the word.71 Constitutional challenges have also plagued Subsection Four in 
the circuit courts.72 With respect to a constitutional overbreadth challenge, the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have reached contrary conclusions, with the Fourth 
Circuit concluding Subsection Four is constitutional and the Ninth Circuit 
concluding it is unconstitutionally over broad.73 
B. Interpreting Encouragement: The Differing Opinions  
of the Circuit Courts 
In 1992, the Fourth Circuit discussed the ambiguity of the term “encour-
age” in United States v. Oloyede.74 In Oloyede, two defendants, Clifford 
Cooper and Oluwole Oloyede, were found guilty of violating Subsection 
Four.75 Cooper was an immigration attorney who assisted immigrants in their 
applications before Immigration and Naturalization Services, while Oloyede 
sold fraudulent application materials to immigrants.76 On appeal to the Fourth 
                                                                                                                           
Justice, Causa Immigrant Rights Coalition of Oregon, Catholic Charities of Oregon, and Immigra-
tion Counseling Services of Oregon in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 15, Sineneng-Smith, 910 
F.3d 461 (No. 15-10614), 2017 WL 4814895 [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae, Sineneng-Smith] 
(arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) should be constructed to distinguish between immigra-
tion cases that have a remedy and those that do not). 
 71 See Thum, 749 F.3d at 1147 (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s definition for “encourage”); 
DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 248 (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “encourage” 
excluding “help”); Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1249 (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of en-
courage “encourage,” including “to help”); Yoshida, 303 F.3d at 1150 (equating “encourage” with 
“help”); He, 245 F.3d at 959–60 (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “encourage,” 
including “to help” relying on multiple dictionary definitions of “encourage”); Oloyede, 982 F.2d 
at 136 (approving of the district court’s usage of Black’s Law Dictionary to define “encourage”). 
 72 See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 469–85 (discussing a constitutional overbreadth challenge 
to Subsection Four); Anderton, 910 F.3d at 282–84 (considering the constitutional vagueness of 
Subsection Four); Tracy, 456 F. App’x at 271–72 (addressing both a constitutional overbreadth 
challenge and a constitutional vagueness challenge). 
 73 See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485 (finding that Subsection Four was unconstitutionally 
overbroad); Tracy, 456 F. App’x at 272 (holding that Subsection Four was constitutional in the 
face of an overbreadth challenge). 
 74 See Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 136–37 (discussing the statute’s use of the word “encourage”). 
 75 See id. at 135–36 (noting that defendants were convicted under Subsection Four); id. at 136 
(approving of the district court’s usage of Black’s Law Dictionary to define “encourage”). Be-
cause Oloyede was decided before the passage of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, Subsection Four is identified as 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(D). See Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 203 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) 
and indicating a different labeling system is to be applied); Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 133 (noting that 
the decision was rendered on November 24, 1992). 
 76 Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 135. At the time of this case, Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(INS) oversaw most activities relating to immigration, including border control, undocumented 
immigrant removal, and asylum petitions. See Late Twentieth Century, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMI-
GRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/agency-history/late-
twentieth-century [https://perma.cc/H5MB-4S4C] (outlining the tasks that INS’s engaged in dur-
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Circuit, the defendants questioned whether their activities fell within the pro-
hibited action of the statute.77 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the lower 
court’s use of Black’s Law Dictionary to define “encourage” and approved of 
its finding.78 At the time, Black’s Law Dictionary definition of encourage “in-
clude[d] actions taken to embolden or make confident.”79 Although the court 
approved of the lower court’s finding, it reasoned that an analysis of Subsec-
tion Four’s statutory history was more persuasive.80 Based upon this analysis, 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of the defendants.81 
The Seventh Circuit addressed the ambiguity of the term “encourage” in 
2001, in United States v. He.82 Based upon evidence that indicated that the 
defendant, Andy He, had forged travel documents and attempted to help a 
woman come to the United States, He was charged under Subsection Four.83 
During deliberations, the jury asked for further instruction regarding the defi-
                                                                                                                           
ing the 1980s and 1990s). The INS was disbanded in 2003, and separated into U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Pro-
tection. See Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
about-us/our-history [https://perma.cc/FE79-GMP6] (describing how the INS was disbanded and 
superseded by three new organizations). Oloyede would sell undocumented immigrants fraudulent 
documents, such as social security numbers and job authorization, and then refer them to Cooper 
for their INS matters. Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 135. At trial, eight of Cooper’s clients testified that the 
defendants led them to believe that they could obtain legal status. Id. at 135–36. 
 77 See Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 135 (describing the issues raised by the defendants). The defend-
ants specifically questioned whether the statute applied to aliens who were already living in the 
United States. Id. 
 78 See id. at 136 (discussing the lower court’s use of Black’s Law Dictionary). 
 79 Id. The court also noted how, according to the lower court, the defendants’ actions “helped” 
aliens to stay in the country. Id. 
 80 See id. at 136–37 (agreeing with the district court’s finding but engaging in a statutory 
analysis). The Fourth Circuit noted that “encourage” was not anywhere else in the statute, and as 
such engaged in observing the statutory history. Id. The court noted that IRCA “expan[ded] . . . 
the types of activities held criminal under this statute.” Id. at 137. As such, the defendant’s actions 
fell within the definition of “encourage.” Id. 
 81 Id. at 137 (confirming the defendant’s conviction). 
 82 See He, 245 F.3d at 959–60 (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “encourage,” 
including “to help,” and noting multiple dictionary definitions of “encourage” to support its con-
clusion). 
 83 Id. at 956. According to the evidence presented, a woman named Jin Xing Yang arrived in 
O’Hare International Airport from Narita, Japan, and presented a forged United States passport to an 
INS officer. Id. at 955. Yang was travelling with the defendant, Andy He, and the trial evidence 
would eventually indicate that He had forged Yang’s passport, provided her transportation to the 
United States, and assisted her in filling out her Customs Declaration form. Id. at 956. Evidence 
indicated that He and Yang were sitting next to each other on the flight, that the passport was 
forged in New York where He lived, that He had a bank receipt equivalent to the cost of the plane 
tickets, and he admitted to assisting Yang fill out her Customs form. Id. Additional evidence in-
cluded a slip of paper in Yang’s possession that contained a New York City phone number and 
address that He admitted was his uncle’s address, and that He had his boarding pass as well as one 
with Yang’s fake name, Yang’s Chinese identification card, and two airline tickets for him and 
Yang from Chicago to New York, in his pocket. Id. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B), Mr. He 
was subject to either a fine, or not more than ten years imprisonment, or both. 8 U.S.C. § 1324. 
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nition of “encourage.”84 The Government proposed that the Court use the 
definition provided in Black’s Law Dictionary, but He’s counsel objected, 
arguing that the dictionary definition was overly broad.85 In consideration of 
He’s concern, the judge did not adopt the full Black’s Law Dictionary defini-
tion, but instead instructed the jury that “encourage” meant “to instigate, help 
or advise.”86 After receiving this additional instruction, the jury found He 
guilty.87 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the supplemental jury instruc-
tion.88 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the definition was taken 
from Black’s Law Dictionary, and because it was in accordance with other 
dictionary definitions, the instruction did not inappropriately distort the mean-
ing of encourage under the statute.89 Since its decision in He, the Seventh 
Circuit has shortened the definition of “encourage” to only require that the 
prosecution prove that the defendant “knowingly helped or advised the al-
iens.”90 
Shortly after the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit was al-
so confronted with a case that required it to directly address the definition of 
“encourage” in Subsection Four.91 In United States v. Lopez, the defendant, 
Jorge Lopez, was driving a boat from the Bahamas to Miami that contained 
seventeen undocumented immigrants.92 He was charged under Subsection 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See id. at 957 (asking, more specifically, for a better definition for “encouraged”). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. The definition provided by the district court also included “knowingly” to ensure that 
the jury knew the correct criminal standard to apply. Id. At the time, Black’s Law Dictionary pro-
vided that “encourage” meant “to instigate; to incite to action; to give courage to; to inspirit; to em-
bolden; to raise confidence; to make confident; to help; to forward; to advise.” Id. at 959 n.4. 
 87 See id. at 958 (finding Mr. He guilty as charged). The district court later sentenced He to 
five months in prison, two years supervised release, and a $3,000 fine. Id. 
 88 Id. at 959. 
 89 Id. at 959–60. 
 90 See United States v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding, relying on He, that 
encouraged means “knowingly helped or advised” (citing He, 245 F.3d at 957–59)). In Fujii, the 
defendant, Masao Fujii, was caught using a fraudulent passport with three Chinese nationals, after 
they arrived in O’Hare International Airport from Seoul, South Korea. Id. at 537. INS agents became 
concerned when Fujii’s passport did not show all of the security features. Id. When questioned by an 
INS agent, Fujii admitted to transporting the three Chinese nationals, but claimed that he was forced 
to do so by the Cambodian mafia. Id. at 538. The jury found Fujii guilty under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Id. On appeal, Fujii argued that the Government failed to prove that he “encour-
aged” the three Chinese nationals to come to the United States. Id. The Seventh Circuit was unper-
suaded, though, finding that based on Fujii’s confession he was helping a man from the Cambodian 
mafia get these three Chinese nationals into the United States. Id. at 540 (citing to He, 245 F.3d at 
957–59, to conclude that Fujii’s confession indicates that he “encouraged” these three Chinese na-
tionals). 
 91 See Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1248 (holding that the district court’s reliance on Black’s Law Dic-
tionary for a definition was appropriate). 
 92 See id. at 1243 (describing how the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted Lopez’s boat and found 
seventeen aliens aboard). At trial, Lopez’s codefendant testified against him, and claimed that he and 
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Four, as well as 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) and 8 U.S.C. § 1327.93 During 
deliberations, the jury asked for clarification regarding the charge associated 
with Subsection Four, specifically asking whether the word “encourage” re-
quired Lopez to have communicated with the immigrants.94 The district court 
here also relied on the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “encourage,” and 
provided the full definition as it appears in the dictionary.95 Shortly thereafter, 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty under Subsection Four.96 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to 
use the definition provided by Black’s Law Dictionary.97 The Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that the definition was appropriate because it provided an “ordi-
                                                                                                                           
Lopez had a contact in the Bahamas who told them where to pick up the passengers, and that they 
agreed to split the proceeds equally. Id. at 1244. Lopez’s codefendant testified that the proceeds 
would be four thousand dollars per person, and that after they deducted transportation costs, they 
would split the remainder. Id. The codefendant already pled guilty and agreed to testify against 
Lopez. Id. Lopez countered his codefendant’s testimony by claiming that he did not know that the 
seventeen passengers were undocumented, and said they were invited on to the boat by the codefend-
ant. Id. at 1245. 
 93 Id. at 1243. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) of Title 8 of the United States Code provides that it 
is illegal for any person to engage in the conspiracy of any of subsections (A)(i), (A)(ii), (A)(iii), 
and Subsection Four. 8 U.S.C. § 1324. Lopez was likely charged under this provision either be-
cause he engaged in conspiracy with his codefendant to bring the seventeen immigrants into the 
United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) or because he engaged in a conspiracy to 
“encourage” the seventeen immigrants to enter the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). See Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1243 (detailing Lopez’s action of transporting seven-
teen immigrants). Title 8, section 1327 provides that it is illegal to knowingly assist or aid any 
alien who is already inadmissible, or conspire to permit such an alien to enter into the United 
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1327. Because the allegations were that the seventeen immigrants were undoc-
umented, it is likely that the immigrants were already inadmissible. See Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1243 
(describing how Lopez transported seventeen immigrants). 
 94 See id. at 1246 & n.2, 1247 (noting how the Government initially suggested Black’s Law 
Dictionary definition of “encourage” for jury instructions and that later the district judge overruled 
Lopez’s objection and used the Government’s suggested definition); see also He, 245 F.3d at 957 
(suggesting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of encourage). Lopez’s counsel objected to the 
definition suggested by the Government on the grounds that encourage was commonly understood 
to include more than just to help. Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1246–47. 
 95 See Lopez at 1246 & n.2, 1247 (identifying the Government’s suggested definition of “en-
courage” based on Black’s Law Dictionary and then noting that was the definition the court pro-
vided to the jury). At the time, the Black’s Law Dictionary definition for “encourage” was “to 
instigate, to incite to action, to give courage to, to inspirit, to embolden, to raise confidence, to 
help, to forward, and/or to advise.” Id. at 1246 n.2. 
 96 Id. at 1247. Lopez was found guilty of all charges, which included those under § 1327. Id. 
During trial, the jury inquired whether the knowledge element of § 1327 required Lopez to have 
personal knowledge that an immigrant was inadmissible before they got on the boat, or when they 
arrived in the United States. Id. at 1246. The district court instructed that there was no temporal 
requirement. Id. On appeal, Lopez argued that this supplemental instruction was incorrect, because 
§ 1327 required that Lopez knew when the immigrants were boarding the boat that one was inad-
missible. Id. at 1254. The court rejected this argument, finding instead that as long as Lopez met 
the knowledge requirement, when he acquired this knowledge did not matter. Id. at 1255. 
 97 See id. at 1248–49, 1258 (upholding the supplemental instruction to the jury, and affirming 
Lopez’s convictions). 
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nary meaning” and “common usage” of the term.98 The Eleventh Circuit also 
rejected Lopez’s argument that including “to help” in the definition created an 
overly broad construction and was thus inappropriate.99 The court instead 
reasoned that because multiple dictionaries include “to help” in their defini-
tions of the word “encourage,” the definition was “internally consistent.”100 
Since its decision in Lopez, the Eleventh Circuit has construed the definition 
of “encourage” as broadly as “helping” an alien come to the United States.101 
The Third Circuit relies on a different definition of “encourage” than 
those used by the Fourth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.102 In DelRio-Mocci 
v. Connolly Properties Inc., the plaintiff, a tenant of one of the defendant’s 
properties, alleged that the defendant was conspiring to rent apartments to 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id. at 1248–49. 
 99 See id. at 1249, 1251 (presenting Lopez’s argument and then rejecting it summarily). Lopez 
argued that this overly broad construction would render both § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) and 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) superfluous. Id. at 1249. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, first 
for § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) by determining that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) criminalizes more than just transpor-
tation because it requires an alien to actually be brought to a port of entry. Id. at 1250. The Elev-
enth Circuit then rejected the argument that the statutory interpretation renders 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) superfluous because the interpretation relies upon other subsections of the 
statute, and therefore cannot be superfluous. Id. at 1251. 
 100 See id. at 1249 (concluding that the definitions provided by all the dictionaries included 
“to help,” thus being consistent among themselves and with the supplemental instructions). In 
reaching this decision, the Seventh Circuit relied on United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1278 
(11th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Kuku, 129 F.3d 1435, 1437 (11th Cir. 1997). Id. at 1251. In 
Ndiaye, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant provided immigrants with Social Security 
cards in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324, because a reasonable jury could conclude that such “assis-
tance in helping” an alien to obtain a Social Security card could encourage them to stay in the 
country. 434 F.3d at 1298. In Kuku, the Eleventh Circuit found that when the defendant approved 
Social Security applications for aliens, that such action violated § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). 129 F.3d at 
1437. Judge Rosemary Barkett strongly dissented against the court’s inclusion of “help” in the defini-
tion of encourage in Lopez. See Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1258 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with 
the majority on the its inclusion of “help” within the definition of “encourage,” but concurring 
otherwise). Judge Barkett argued that including “help” in the definition would render § 1324(a)(2), 
which provides that it is illegal to transport aliens into the United States, superfluous. Id. at 1258. 
Thus, with the inclusion of “help” in the definition, Lopez’s action could have been considered illegal 
under either Subsection Four or § 1324(a)(2). See id. at 1258 (arguing that the majority’s construc-
tion of “encourage” in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) would now include transportation, which is exactly 
what § 1324(a)(2) criminalizes, and thus the two statutes are meaningless and redundant). Judge 
Barkett further reasoned that “to help” is inappropriate because encourage implies that affirmative 
action must be taken. See id. at 1259 (explaining how the common usage of encourage requires an 
affirmative act). Judge Barkett compares Lopez’s actions to that of a taxi driver who takes a pas-
senger where they want to go, and distinguishes this from a taxi driver who encourages and takes a 
passenger to a specific site, which would constitute encouraging that passenger to go to that site. 
Id. at 1260. 
 101 See Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the 
court has provided the “broad interpretation” that helping aliens means “encourage,” and relying 
on Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1249–51, Ndiaye, 434 F.3d at 1278, and Kuku, 129 F.3d at 1437, to reach 
that conclusion). 
 102 See DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 250 (differing from its sister circuits to reach the conclu-
sion that “help” was too broad of a definition). 
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aliens, because they were less likely to complain about housing conditions.103 
Under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, “racketeering 
activity” includes 8 U.S.C. § 1324, and to that end the plaintiff alleged that by 
renting to immigrants not lawfully present, the defendant was “encouraging” 
them to reside in the United States.104 The district court granted the defend-
ant’s motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed to the Third Circuit.105 
On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed the defendant’s claim under Sub-
section Four and provided a new definition for “encourage.”106 The Third 
Circuit held that the best definition for “encourage” is “[t]o instigate; to incite 
to action; to give courage to; to inspirit; to embolden; to raise confidence; to 
make confident,” and intentionally excluded the word “help” from its diction-
ary definition.107 The Third Circuit provided this definition in an effort to em-
phasize that in order for an offense to be punishable under Subsection Four, 
the person had to take an affirmative action.108 The Third Circuit explicitly 
distinguished itself from the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits, as it found that 
the inclusion of “to help” in the definition of “encourage” was too broad, and 
rendered other sections of § 1324 superfluous.109 
The Third Circuit’s decision had immediate impact on lower court deci-
sions.110 The defendant in United States v. Henderson, was tried and convict-
ed before DelRio-Mocci was decided.111 In light of the Third Circuit’s deci-
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. at 243–44. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had allowed the property to fall into 
disrepair as a result of this conspiracy. Id. at 243. The plaintiff claimed that this conspiracy was in 
violation of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). See id. at 244 (alleg-
ing that the defendants violated the conspiracy provision of RICO). The plaintiff specifically al-
leged that the defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which provides that it is illegal for a per-
son to conspire to commit any of the actions outlined in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012). 
 104 See DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 245 (noting that on appeal, the defendant argues that he 
adequately pled a RICO predicate act, and then enumerates 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)); see also 
Edwards, 603 F.3d at 1292 (noting that § 274 of the INA falls under the term “racketeering activi-
ty,” which means that 8 U.S.C. § 1324 falls under “racketeering activity”). 
 105 See DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props. Inc., No. 08-2753, 2009 WL 971394, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 9, 2009) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)); see also DelRio-
Mocci, 672 F.3d at 245 (noting the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
 106 See DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 248 (providing an unprompted definition for “encourage”). 
 107 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Lopez, 590 F.3d at 
1259 (Barkett, J., dissenting)). 
 108 See id. (emphasizing that the common sense meaning of encourage prompts someone to do 
something they would not otherwise have done) (citing Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1259 (Barkett, J., dis-
senting)). 
 109 See id. at 249, 250 (reasoning that this broad of an interpretation would render all of the 
other subsections of § 1324(a)(1)(A) superfluous). 
 110 See, e.g., Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (finding that the Third Circuit’s interpretation 
of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to be the most appropriate and applicable in the case at hand). 
 111 See id. at 197 (describing Henderson’s conviction after a six-day trial); see also Verdict, 
Henderson, supra note 2 (declaring a jury verdict of guilty on Count One, dated March 22, 2010). 
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sion, Judge Woodlock granted Henderson a new trial.112 Although the presid-
ing judge found that Henderson’s actions could still constitute “encourage-
ment” under Subsection Four, he was persuaded that the jury should have 
received an instruction that reflected the Third Circuit’s recent findings.113 
In 2014, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the Third Circuit’s findings, 
and instead adopted the Seventh Circuit’s definition.114 In United States v. 
Thum, Jorge Humberto Thum was on supervised release, when he met with 
Aldo Varguez-Rodriguez, an alien who had recently entered the United States 
from Mexico.115 After a short discussion, the two men left the restaurant 
where they had met and walked to a van pick-up station located across the 
street, and Thum then arranged for Varguez-Rodriguez to take a van going to 
Los Angeles, California.116 Thum was arrested and charged with violating 
Subsection Four, which in turn violated the terms of his supervised release.117 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 209–10, 214 (granting defendant’s motion for new 
trial). 
 113 See id. at 204, 209–210 (finding that Henderson’s actions fall within the definition of “en-
courage,” but that the jury did not have the instruction as described by the Third Circuit). 
 114 See Thum, 749 F.3d at 1147 (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s definition for “encourage”). 
Before Thum, the Ninth Circuit indicated that encourage could include “help.” Yoshida, 303 F.3d 
at 1150. In Yoshida, the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury conviction of Yuami Yoshida. See id. at 1147, 
1150 (finding that a reasonable jury could convict based on the circumstantial evidence present-
ed). Yoshida had allegedly been part of a larger operation, whereby aliens seeking to travel to the 
United States would travel from China, to Thailand, then to Japan, and finally to the United States. 
See id. at 1147–48 (describing the organization and its operation to get people to the United 
States). Three women, Zhuan Dan Lin (“Zhuan”), Cheng Huang (“Cheng”), and Yue Rong Lin 
(“Yue”), participated in this operation. Id. at 1147–48. Once at the airport in Japan, they were in-
structed to follow Yoshida, who boarded a flight to the United States. See id. at 1148 (stating that the 
individuals adhered to the instructions provided by their male escort). The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that a reasonable jury could have inferred that Yoshida encour-
aged Zhuan, Cheng, and Yue because she led them to the correct flight. See id. at 1150 (reasoning 
that Yoshida led the girls through a complex airport to arrive at the flight just before it took off so 
that they would avoid scrutiny). Thus, the Ninth Circuit established that someone walking through 
an airport with three aliens following them was enough to “encourage.” See id. at 1151 (upholding 
the jury’s finding that Yoshida was guilty under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)). 
 115 Thum, 749 F.3d at 1144–45. Thum and Varguez-Rodriguez met at a Jack in the Box restau-
rant. Id. at 1144–45. Thum was previously charged and pled guilty in the District Court for the 
Southern District of California to transporting immigrants under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), and aiding and 
abetting immigrants under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II). Id. at 1144. Under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II), a defendant is subjected to the same exact punishment that they would be 
under Subsection Four. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (noting that under subsection (a)(1)(A), a person 
would be punished in accordance with subparagraph (B)). Here, Thum was sentenced to thirty-
three months in prison and two years of supervised release. Thum, 749 F.3d at 1144. 
 116 Thum, 749 F.3d at 1145. 
 117 Id. Under the terms of his supervised release, Thum was not allowed to commit a federal 
crime. See id. (noting that Thum violated his supervised release by allegedly committing a federal 
crime). Supervised release is a time after serving a prison sentence where a defendant is required 
to periodically meet with a parole officer, and adhere to certain conditions. See Note, Designing a 
Prisoner Reentry System Hardwired to Manage Disputes, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1349–50 
(2010) (describing the system for supervised release). Courts are required to impose certain condi-
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The district court held an evidentiary hearing and determined, based on testi-
mony from the arresting agent and Thum’s parole officer that he had commit-
ted a crime under Subsection Four thereby violating his supervised release.118 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and 
remanded the case with the instruction to dismiss the petition.119 The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that by simply providing transportation away from the bor-
der, Thum did not actually encourage the alien to reside in the United 
States.120 The court found that because Thum would be transporting Varguez-
Rodriguez within the United States, his actions were not illegal under Subsec-
tion Four.121 The Ninth Circuit approved of the Seventh Circuit’s definition 
for encourage as “to inspire with courage, spirit, or hope . . . to spur on . . . to 
give help or patronage to.”122 Despite seemingly adopting the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s definition, the court held that in order for Thum to be convicted under 
Subsection Four, he would need to have taken steps to “encourage” Varguez-
                                                                                                                           
tions based on the crime, and may impose additional conditions. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, 
Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal Supervised Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 
180, 196 (2013). If a defendant violates the conditions of their release, then they can either be 
sanctioned by their parole officer or, if the violation is serious enough, the parole officer is re-
quired to report it to the court. See Note, supra, at 1349–50 (describing the conditions placed upon 
a defendant during supervised release). In the instance where the defendant’s violation is reported 
to the court, the court can either leave the terms of supervised release as they are, or revoke the 
defendant’s supervised release and sentence them to an additional term. Id. at 1350. The system of 
supervised release has been critiqued by multiple scholars for various reasons. See Fiona Doherty, 
Intermediate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 
1009 (2013) (arguing that the structure of supervised release has rendered the time to be served 
indeterminate); Scott-Hayward, supra, at 200–01 (noting the fiscal burden that supervised release 
imposes, and the negative impact on individuals); Note, supra, at 1352–53 (advocating for reentry 
courts would be a better rehabilitative measure than supervised release). 
 118 See Thum, 749 F.3d at 1144–45. Thum had previously violated the terms of his supervised 
release by not reporting to his probation officer. Id. at 1144. The court added an additional two 
years of supervised release to his sentence. Id. at 1145. The district court sentenced Thum to time 
served, and added two years of supervised release to his sentence. Id. 
 119 See id. at 1149 (vacating the district court’s revocation of Thum’s supervised release). 
 120 See id. at 1146 (noting that the evidence only indicated that Thum intended to transport 
Varguez-Rodriguez to Northern California). 
 121 See id. at 1146 (acknowledging Thum’s persuasive argument that his actions were not in 
violation of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)). Thum argued that his actions would be illegal under 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), but not Subsection Four. Id. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) provides that it is illegal to 
transport an alien within the United States, which is exactly what Thum was prepared to do for 
Varguez-Rodriguez. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii); Thum 749 F.3d at 1146. The Court proceeded to 
reject the government’s argument that by leading Varguez-Rodriguez to the van meant to transport 
him further north, he was encouraging Varguez-Rodriguez to reside within the United States. See 
Thum, 749 F.3d at 1147 (noting that the government’s argument “clashes” with the statute’s text). 
The court was not persuaded by this argument because such an interpretation is already provided 
in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). Id. 
 122 Thum, 749 F.3d at 1147 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting He, 245 F.3d at 960). The 
Ninth Circuit also relied upon its holding in Yoshida to reach this conclusion. See id. (noting that 
in Yoshida, the court had previously “equated” encourage and “to help” (citing Yoshida, 303 F.3d 
at 1150)). 
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Rodriguez to reside in the United States as opposed to merely supplying him 
transportation.123 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that Thum had not violated 
Subsection Four, and as such he did not violate his supervised release.124 Alt-
hough the court seemed to have adopted the Seventh Circuit’s definition for 
“encourage,” and resolved the ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit later found that 
Subsection Four was unconstitutional.125 
Five circuit courts have grappled with the definition of “encourage,” and 
each has come out with a different statutory interpretation, while two are split 
over whether the statute itself is unconstitutional.126 In 2011, the Fourth Cir-
cuit addressed Subsection Four’s constitutional breadth in United States v. 
Tracy.127 The defendant, Anthony Tracy, worked to procure fraudulent travel 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Id. 
 124 See id. at 1148 (reversing the district court and holding that Thum did not violate the terms 
of his supervised release). 
 125 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485; see also Ninth Circuit Invites Amicus Briefs on Question 
of Whether Statutory Provision Criminalizing Encouraging or Inducing an Alien to Reside in the 
U.S. Is Overbroad or Void for Vagueness, INTERPRETER RELEASES, Sept. 25, 2017, at 7, 7–8 Art. 
7 [hereinafter Ninth Circuit Invites Amicus Briefs] (reporting that the Ninth Circuit invited amicus 
briefing with respect to Subsection Four’s constitutionality). 
 126 See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485 (concluding that Subsection Four was overbroad); 
Thum, 749 F.3d at 1147 (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s definition for “encourage”); DelRio-
Mocci, 672 F.3d at 248 (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “encourage” excluding 
“help”); Tracy, 456 F. App’x at 272 (finding that Subsection Four was not overbroad); Lopez, 590 
F.3d at 1249 (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “encourage,” including “to help”); 
Yoshida, 303 F.3d at 1150 (identifying “helping” as a possible definition for “encourage”); He, 
245 F.3d at 959 (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “encourage,” including “to 
help”). There have been constitutional challenges to Subsection Four in other circuit courts, but 
they did not address the overbreadth issue. See, e.g., Aberton, 901 F.3d at 282–84 (assessing the 
potential constitutional vagueness of Subsection Four). For instance, in the Fifth Circuit there was 
a constitutional vagueness challenge to Subsection Four. See id. at 282–83 (describing appellee’s 
constitutional vagueness challenge); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (es-
tablishing the void-for-vagueness doctrine requirements). Under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, and its application to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, a statute must 
satisfy two elements to be declared void for vagueness. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 
402–03 (2010) (identifying the two elements of a constitutional vagueness challenge). The first 
element is notice, which requires that the law was articulated in a way that an “ordinary person exer-
cising common sense” can understand what conduct the law is prohibiting. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n 
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 578 (1973); see Cristina D. Lockwood, 
Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 271–72 (2010) (discussing the notice element). The second ele-
ment in a void-for-vagueness challenge is that the law cannot be enforced in an arbitrary and discrim-
inatory manner. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357–58 (noting the importance of the equal enforcement 
of the law). The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded by a constitutional-vagueness argument and 
found that based upon the language in the statute, both encourage and induce were “sufficiently 
clear to provide fair notice to the public.” Aberton, 901 F.3d at 283. 
 127 Tracy, 456 F. App’x at 272. The defendant not only raised a constitutional challenge to 
Subsection Four’s breadth, but also a vagueness challenge. Id. at 271–72. The Fourth Circuit 
summarily dismissed this argument by finding that a “person of ordinary intelligence” would 
know that the defendant’s actions constituted a violation of Subsection Four. Id. 
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documents for aliens.128 These documents would allow the aliens to travel 
from Kenya to Cuba.129 Tracy would meet with the undocumented immi-
grants in Kenya to give them the documents, and tell them how to travel from 
Cuba to the United States.130 Based on these actions, Tracy was indicted by a 
grand jury for conspiracy to induce or encourage undocumented immigrants 
to come to the United States.131 Tracy moved to dismiss the conspiracy 
charge, but the district court denied his motion, and Tracy later pled guilty to 
the charge.132 On Tracy’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit, he raised the question 
about the constitutional reach of Subsection Four.133 The Fourth Circuit 
acknowledged there are instances where the statute might “chill[] protected 
speech,” but did not find that this potential chilling effect warranted holding 
Subsection Four unconstitutionally broad.134 
After the Fourth Circuit’s holding, Subsection Four was again subjected 
to a constitutional overbreadth challenge in the Ninth Circuit.135 In 2018, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of Subsection Four in United 
States v. Sineneng-Smith.136 Between 1990 and 2008, the defendant, Evelyn 
Sineneng-Smith, ran an immigration consulting business that assisted immi-
grants in obtaining employment-based visas to work in the residential 
healthcare industry.137 The district court found that she violated Subsection 
Four when she made representations to certain clients that would lead them to 
believe that they were legally allowed to stay in the United States, when they 
were in fact unlawfully present.138 Sineneng-Smith appealed the district 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Id. at 270. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 269. 
 131 Id. The indictment for Tracy only provides that he violated 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). 
See id. (providing part of the indictment); see also Indictment at 4, United States v. Tracy (E.D. Va. 
Apr. 7, 2010) (No. 1:10-cr-00122-LMB) (describing Tracy’s actions and then concluding that such 
actions were in violation of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I)). This is because § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) prohibits 
conspiracy to commit any actions enumerated in the previous subsections. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). Thus, even though it may seem as though Tracy was only charged under 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), the criminal case cover sheet provides that Tracy was charged under both 
Subsection Four and § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), because Tracy was charged with conspiracy to violate 
Subsection Four. See Indictment at attachment 1, United States v. Tracy (No. 1:10-cr-00122-
LMB) (providing the code and sections that Tracy was indicted under). 
 132 Tracy, 456 F. Appx at 269. Tracy appealed the conviction based upon the denial of his mo-
tion to dismiss. Id. 
 133 Id. at 272. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 475–76 (noting that the Fourth Circuit is the only other 
circuit to address this issue). 
 136 See id. at 485 (concluding that Subsection Four is constitutionally overbroad). 
 137 See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, No. CR-10-00414, 2013 WL 6776188, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 23, 2013) (explaining Sineneng-Smith’s business operation). 
 138 See id. at *3–5 (finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Sineneng-Smith was 
guilty with respect to encouraging Amelia Guillermo and Hermansita Esteban to reside in the Unit-
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court’s decision and after receiving briefs from both parties, the Ninth Circuit 
asked for additional briefing to specifically address the issue of Subsection 
Four’s constitutionality.139 In consideration of this briefing, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that Subsection Four was unconstitutional under the overbreadth 
doctrine.140 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AND THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE 
To declare a statute overly broad, a court must find that the statute vio-
lates the overbreadth doctrine.141 The overbreadth doctrine is a facial chal-
lenge to a statute under the First Amendment.142 Under the overbreadth doc-
trine, a statute is overly broad if it regulates a substantial portion of protected 
speech.143 As part of an overbreadth analysis, a court must determine that the 
statute regulates protected speech.144 Upon determining that the statute regu-
lates protected speech, the first step to an overbreadth analysis is to construe 
the statute, an analysis for which the Supreme Court has adopted a variety of 
approaches.145 After construing the statute, the court considers jus tertii, or 
third-party standing, whereby the defendant may assert that based on instanc-
                                                                                                                           
ed States). In connection with this business, Sineneng-Smith had two clients named Guillermo and 
Esteban. Id. at *1. Initially, Sineneng-Smith was convicted after a twelve-day trial based upon three 
clients. Id. at *1–2. On appeal, the court did not find that her interactions with one of the clients con-
stituted a violation of Subsection Four because she only lent the client money. See id. at *6 (discuss-
ing how the government’s argument fails with respect to Oliver Galupo). The court equated such an 
agreement with hiring an unlawful alien and such action does not constitute a violation of Subsection 
Four. Id. (citing Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 3028 (D.N.J. 2005)). 
 139 Order at 1, Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461 (No. 15-10614), ECF No. 46; see also Ninth 
Circuit Invites Amicus Briefs, supra note 125, at 7–8 (noting that the Ninth Circuit called for briefs 
to address the constitutionality of Subsection Four). 
 140 See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485 (concluding that Subsection Four was unconstitution-
ally overbroad). The Supreme Court has denied certiorari with respect to the constitutional vague-
ness challenge. Anderton, 901 F.3d 278, cert. denied, No.18-846, 2019 WL 659880 (U.S. Feb. 19, 
2019). 
 141 See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 429 (2017) (describing how a law can be 
found to be facially overbroad under the overbreadth doctrine). 
 142 See id. (identifying the challenge as a “facial” one); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense 
of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991) (explaining how the overbreadth doctrine is a 
facial challenge under the First Amendment). 
 143 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (noting that under the First 
Amendment overbreadth challenge, there needs to be a substantial number of applications where-
by the statute is unconstitutional (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 
552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008))). 
 144 See Fallon, supra note 142, at 867 (arguing that because the substantive First Amendment 
principle is especially sensitive to content-based regulations of protected speech, the overbreadth 
doctrine should also be especially sensitive). 
 145 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008) (noting that the first step in an 
overbreadth analysis is to construe the statute). Compare Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474 (construing the 
statute and reading it to have “an alarming amount of breadth”), with Williams, 553 U.S. at 293–
98 (using a variety of factors to construe the statute). 
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es where a third party’s protected speech is illegal under the statute, the stat-
ute should be declared overly broad and thus in violation of the First 
Amendment.146 
A. Protected Speech: Determining Whether Advocacy Speech Is Protected 
When mounting a facial challenge to a statute under the overbreadth 
doctrine, a crucial part of the analysis is establishing that the statute regulates 
protected speech.147 The Supreme Court has applied many analyses to deter-
mine whether a certain type of speech falls into a protected category.148 In 
instances where the speech advocates unlawful conduct, the Supreme Court 
has explicitly held that it is unconstitutional for statutes to prohibit advocacy 
speech.149 Despite this, the Court has carved out certain exceptions where the 
prohibition of advocacy speech is acceptable.150 To determine whether a form 
of advocacy speech can be criminalized, the Supreme Court established the 
Brandenburg standard in 1969.151 
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, Clarence Brandenburg, a leader of the Ku Klux 
Klan (“KKK”), was charged and sentenced under the Ohio Criminal Syndi-
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 476 (describing the arguments made regarding third-party rights 
of hunters after construing the statute); Williams, 553 U.S. at 297 (noting that after construing the 
statute, the next step is to determine if the statute prohibits a substantial amount of protected 
speech); see also Fallon, supra note 142, at 863 (identifying the overbreadth doctrine under the 
First Amendment as an exception to jus tertii, which allows a defendant to articulate situations 
where the law would violate the protected speech). 
 147 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872–74 (1997) (addressing the overbreadth issue 
after reaching the conclusion that the statute was content-based and the speech it was regulating 
was protected in accordance with the Miller test); see also Fallon, supra note 142, at 867 (arguing 
that because the substantive First Amendment principle is especially sensitive to content-based 
regulations of protected speech, the overbreadth doctrine should also be especially sensitive). 
 148 See Stevens, 559 U.S at 468–69 (noting the historical categories where the Supreme Court 
has recognized exceptions to First Amendment protections); see also Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (providing an exception for speech 
regarding fraud); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (providing an exception for 
speech that incites lawless action); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (providing an 
exception for “obscenity”); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–55 (1952) (providing an 
exception for defamation); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) 
(providing an exception for speech that is “integral” to the crime); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (establishing the standard to determine whether “fighting words” are 
protected). 
 149 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48 (finding that the state cannot make a law forbidding 
advocacy of unlawful action). 
 150 See id. (establishing the standard used to determine whether the speech is protected or 
not). 
 151 Id. at 444, 447–48 (establishing the standard and noting that the case was decided on June 
9, 1969); see also Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advoca-
cy of Unlawful Action, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209, 240 (identifying the Brandenburg standard to 
require “(1) express advocacy of law violation; (2) the advocacy must call for immediate law 
violation; and (3) the immediate law violation must be likely to occur”). 
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calism Statute.152 The statute provided that it was illegal to advocate for “the 
duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful meth-
ods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political re-
form.”153 The defendant had invited the announcer-reporter of a Cincinnati 
television station to attend and film a KKK rally, which was then broadcasted 
on local and national television.154 A portion of the film that was broadcasted 
featured the defendant boasting about the high number of KKK members, and 
stating that although the KKK was “not a revengent organization,” if the 
President, Congress, and the Supreme Court “continue[d] to suppress the 
white, Caucasian race,” the KKK might have to take some “revengance.”155 
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s conviction, and held the 
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute unconstitutional because it violated the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.156 The Court found that a state cannot for-
bid the “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.”157 Thus, Brandenburg classifies 
speech as protected speech, unless that speech “(1) express[es] advocacy of 
law violation; (2) the advocacy . . . call[s] for [imminent] law violation;” and 
(3) that such law violation is likely to occur.158 If the language does not satis-
fy any part of this standard then the speech is protected.159 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444. Clarence Brandenburg was the appellant and identified as a 
leader of the Ku Klux Klan. Id. 
 153 Id. at 444–45. The statute was similar to criminal syndicalism laws enacted in twenty other 
states and two territories. Id. at 447. Criminal syndicalism laws were enacted under the pretext that 
there was a need to prosecute the threat of violent rebellion. See Ahmed A. White, The Crime of 
Economic Radicalism: Criminal Syndicalism Laws and the Industrial Workers of the World 1917-
1927, 85 OR. L. REV. 649, 700–01 (2006) (identifying the need to prosecute as a pretext to justify 
the criminalization of advocacy). 
 154 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445. 
 155 Id. at 445–46. The film depicted twelve people in Klan regalia gathered around a large burn-
ing cross, uttering derogatory phrases about African Americans and Jews. Id. These derogatory re-
marks included “[a] dirty nigger,” “[s]end the Jews back to Israel,” and “[b]ury the niggers,” among 
other phrases. Id. at 446 n.1. There was also footage of the defendant making a statement that he 
believed that “the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.” Id. at 447. 
 156 See id. at 445, 448 (reversing, and noting that under its established standard, the Ohio 
statute would not survive). 
 157 Id. at 447. The Court did not actually address whether Brandenburg’s actions fell within 
the standard, but rather held that the statute was unconstitutional. See id. at 448–49, 449 n.3 (ad-
dressing the statute, but not addressing Brandenburg’s actions). 
 158 See Schwartz, supra note 151, at 240 (parsing out the Brandenburg standard, and deter-
mining that it requires: “(1) express advocacy of law violation; (2) the advocacy must call for 
immediate law violation; and (3) the immediate law violation must be likely to occur”). 
 159 See DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3.5 (2012) 
(explaining how the Brandenburg standard was applied to Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), 
whereby the Court found that the defendant’s language was not imminent and thus was protected). 
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The Court further developed the Brandenburg standard in 1973 with 
Hess v. Indiana.160 In Hess the defendant was charged with violating Indi-
ana’s disorderly conduct statute when he claimed, “[w]e’ll take the fucking 
street later” during an antiwar protest.161 The trial court found that Hess’s 
words did intend to incite further violence, but only at some point in the in-
definite future.162 As such, because Hess’s words did not demonstrate immi-
nence, this speech also did not satisfy the Brandenburg standard and Hess’s 
speech is protected.163 Thus, the Hess decision established the imminence 
requirement of the Brandenburg standard.164 Since then, the Brandenburg 
standard has not been substantially modified, and continues to be the standard 
used to determine whether speech is protected.165 
B. The Overbreadth Doctrine 
The overbreadth doctrine provides that a statute is overly broad when 
the amount of protected speech and expression that the statute regulates is 
substantial.166 The origin of the overbreadth doctrine has been traced back to 
the 1940s when the Supreme Court determined that there needed to be a more 
aggressive facial challenge to overly broad laws.167 The doctrine was later 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See id. (noting that Hess applied the Brandenburg standard and clarified the “imminent” 
part of the standard). 
 161 414 U.S. at 107. An alternative is that Hess said “we’ll take the fucking street again.” Id. 
The Indiana disorderly conduct statute provided that, “Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or 
disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or 
unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior, threatening, traducing, quarreling, chal-
lenging to fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct.” Id. at 105 n.1. 
 162 See id. at 108 (noting that the Indiana Supreme Court relied primarily on the trial court’s 
finding that Hess’s statement intended to incite further violence). 
 163 See id. (describing the indefinite nature of Hess’s statement). 
 164 See William Li, Note, Unbaking the Adolescent Cake: The Constitutional Implications of 
Imposing Tort Liability on Publishers of Violent Video Games, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 467, 483 (2003) 
(describing the impact of the Hess decision). 
 165 See Andrianna D. Kastanek, From Hi Man to a Military Takeover of New York City: The 
Evolving Effects of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises on Internet Censorship, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 
383 (2004) (noting that the Brandenburg standard has not been substantially modified). 
 166 See Stevens, 556 U.S. at 473 (noting that a “substantial number of [a statute’s] application 
[must be] unconstitutional” in order for a statute to be overbroad); Williams, 554 U.S. at 292 (not-
ing the substantial overbreadth requirement); Fallon, supra note 142, at 863 (noting that the over-
breadth doctrine requires that a statute be “substantially overbroad”); see also Mary Holper, De-
portation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 648, 664 (2012) 
(noting that a facial challenge to a statute is that a “substantial amount of the conduct is protected 
by the First Amendment”). 
 167 See Fallon, supra note 142, at 863 (explaining the history of the overbreadth doctrine, and 
pinpointing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), as the decision that marked the beginning 
of the overbreadth doctrine). In Thornhill, the defendant, Byron Thornhill was charged with vio-
lating a state law that prohibited picketing and loitering. 310 U.S. at 91–92. Thornhill had been 
picketing at the plant for the Brown Wood Preserving Company. Id. at 94. The Supreme Court 
found that the statute had to be read on its face in light of its potential First Amendment violation. 
2019] Illegal Encouragement 1229 
limited in 1972 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Broaderick v. Oklaho-
ma.168 
In Broaderick, the plaintiffs challenged certain paragraphs of an Okla-
homa statute that prohibited specific political actions by the state’s classified 
civil servants.169 The Court found that although certain paragraphs of the stat-
ute were potentially overbroad, the overbreadth was not substantial enough to 
merit striking down the entire law.170 The Court further reasoned that any 
overbreadth that was present in these paragraphs could be remedied in an as-
applied, “case-by-case analysis.”171 Since Broaderick, for a court to declare a 
statute unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine, it must find that the 
statute is “substantially” overbroad.172 Thus, it is not enough that there are a 
few instances where protected speech would be criminalized under the stat-
ute, but rather the amount of protected speech that would be criminalized 
must be substantial.173 
In an overbreadth analysis, the court first construes the statute.174 When 
construing the statute, a court can focus on a variety of the statute’s features 
to assist its analysis.175 As two points of comparison, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Williams focused on a variety of factors to reach the conclu-
sion that the statute was not overly broad, while in United States v. Stevens, 
the Court adopted a plain meaning interpretation of the statue.176 
                                                                                                                           
Id. at 96–97. The Court also considered how the statute would be applied to people besides the 
defendant and found that the “range of activities” that the statute regulated would prevent laborers 
from communicating their issues in the workplace. Id. at 98–99, 104. 
 168 413 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1973); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 133 (4th ed. 2012) (noting that the “substantial” requirement was a limitation adopted in 
Broaderick); Fallon, supra note 142, at 863 n.62 (noting that the doctrine has been limited in vari-
ous ways, and identifying Broaderick as a case that limited the overbreadth doctrine). 
 169 413 U.S. at 602–06 (describing how plaintiffs were challenging an Oklahoma statute). The 
statute was Section 818 of Oklahoma’s Merit System of Personnel Administration Act, and the 
plaintiffs were specifically challenging paragraphs six and seven. Id. at 603–06. 
 170 Id. at 615–16. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See STONE ET AL., supra note 168, at 134–35 (describing the impact of Broaderick and 
noting the ambiguities of this limitation). 
 173 See Williams, 533 U.S. at 292–93, 303. 
 174 See id. at 293, 297 (identifying the first step of an overbreadth challenge to construe the 
law, and later identifying the next step as determining if a significant amount of protected speech 
is criminalized). 
 175 See id. at 293–97 (noting the scienter requirement, the use of operative verbs, the subjec-
tive and objective components, the phrases that contain only subjective elements, and definitions 
provided by the statute). But see Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474 (focusing on the lack of using any words 
to indicate cruelty). 
 176 Compare Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474–75 (construing the statute and reading it to have “an 
alarming amount of breadth” and rejecting the government’s canon of interpretation in favor for 
reading the statute with its “ordinary meaning”), with Williams, 553 U.S. at 293–98 (using a varie-
ty of factors to construe the statute). 
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In Williams, the Court found that an Act that prohibited the pandering 
and solicitation of child pornography was not overly broad.177 The Court in 
Williams construed the statute by observing the scienter requirement, the use 
of operative verbs, the subjective and objective components, the phrases 
that contain only subjective elements, and definitions provided by the stat-
ute.178 For the scienter requirement, or the requirement that the acting party 
had some degree of intent of wrongdoing, the Court observed how this par-
ticular statute included “knowingly.”179 The Court noted that the statute in-
cluded the operative verbs of “advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or 
solicits.”180 The Court discussed the subjective and objective elements con-
veyed in the statute through “in a manner that reflects the belief.”181 The 
Court considered how the phrase “in a manner . . . that is intended to cause 
another to believe” expressed only a subjective element.182 Finally, the stat-
ute provided a definition for “sexually explicit conduct.”183 The presence of 
these different features assisted in determining what type of speech the stat-
ute actually covered.184 
                                                                                                                           
 177 553 U.S. at 289–90, 307 (reaching the conclusion that the prior unconstitutional version of 
the statute has been remedied by Congress’s redrafting). The subsection at issue, codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B), provides that it is illegal for any person to knowingly  
advertise[], promote[], present[], distribute[], or solicit[] through the mails, or in in-
terstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any material or 
purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause 
another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or contains—(i) an ob-
scene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a vis-
ual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct . . . . 
Id. at 289–90 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)). 
 178 Id. at 293–97. 
 179 Id. at 294; see Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining scienter as 
the “degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or 
her act or omission”). 
 180 Williams, 553 U.S. at 294–95. 
 181 Id. at 295–96. 
 182 Id. at 296. 
 183 Id. at 296–97. 
 184 Id. at 293. The Court in Williams found that the type of speech that the statute regulated 
did not enjoy First Amendment protection. Id. at 297–99. The Court reached this conclusion by 
finding that offers to engage in the distribution of child pornography made the speech integral to 
the illegal conduct. Id at 297. The principle that speech that is integral to criminal conduct does 
not enjoy constitutional protection was established in Giboney. See 336 U.S. at 489 (establishing 
the exception that speech that is “an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal stat-
ute” is not protected by the First Amendment). This principle was largely dormant from the early 
1990s until 2006, after which the Supreme Court began to apply the principle with increasing 
frequency. See Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 10 COL-
UM. L. REV. 981, 983 & n.1 (noting the increased frequency with which the Supreme Court cites 
Giboney). One of the considerations that the Court in Stevens noted was the “intrinsically related” 
nature of the speech and the illegal activity. See 559 U.S. at 471 (discussing its earlier decision in 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759, 761 (1982), and its conclusion that the “market for child 
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In contrast, the Court in Stevens did not observe nearly as many statu-
tory features as the Court in Williams.185 The Court in Stevens found that a 
statute prohibiting the creation, sale, and distribution of animal cruelty de-
pictions was overly broad.186 In Stevens, the Court considered the Govern-
ment’s argument, which urged the Court to adopt the noscitur a sociis canon 
of interpretation to read additional limitations into the statute.187 The Court 
rejected this argument, instead choosing to focus on the plain meaning of 
the statutory language.188 Also crucial to the Court’s holding was that the 
statute lacked the word “cruelty,” and was therefore lacking a key limiting 
factor or boundary on the speech it restricted.189 After construing the statute, 
the Court considered the arguments asserted by the defendant.190 
For a defendant to successfully challenge a statute for overbreadth, the 
defendant’s actions themselves need not be protected speech.191 Instead, a 
defendant can argue that a third party’s actions are a form of protected speech 
that would be criminalized by the statute at issue.192 The overbreadth doctrine 
thus operates as an exception to jus tertii, or third-party standing.193 Under jus 
tertii, a defendant generally cannot assert a third-party’s rights unless there is 
a relationship whereby the third-party’s rights are dependent upon the defend-
ant’s ability to assert those rights.194 
                                                                                                                           
pornography was ‘intrinsically related’ to the underlying abuse”). In Williams, the Court sought to 
distinguish between the integral-to-the-crime speech, and advocacy speech by stating that there is 
a difference between “a proposal to engage in illegal activity and the abstract advocacy illegality.” 
553 U.S. at 298–99. Thus, as an example, the Court noted that a statement such as “I encourage 
you to obtain child pornography” would fall within the protected category of abstract illegality. Id. 
at 300. 
 185 Compare Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474 (focusing on the lack of using any words to indicate 
cruelty), with Williams, 553 U.S. at 293–97 (noting the scienter requirement, the use of operative 
verbs, the subjective and objective components, the phrases that contain only subjective elements, 
and definitions provided by the statute). 
 186 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482. 
 187 See id. at 474 (outlining the government’s argument). The canon of noscitur a sociis pro-
vides that ambiguous words should be defined based on the words surrounding it. Noscitur a soci-
is, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 179. 
 188 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474–75 (adopting to interpret the language of the statute in ac-
cordance with its “ordinary meaning”). 
 189 See id. at 474 (focusing on the issue that “cruelty” did not limit the statute the way the 
government argues). 
 190 See id. at 475–76 (addressing the potential situations whereby the defendant’s activities 
would be illegal). 
 191 See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 429 (2017) (describing how a defendant’s 
activity need not be constitutionally protected). 
 192 See id. (noting how an overbreadth claim can be brought on the basis of a hypothetical 
third person’s actions). 
 193 See Fallon, supra note 142, at 859–60, 863 (identifying a First Amendment exception to 
jus tertii). 
 194 See id. at 859–60 (describing jus tertii). 
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In Stevens, the defendant successfully argued that the statue was overly 
broad, because of how it applied to the actions of a third-party, specifically 
hunters.195 The defendant’s was accused of filming and distributing videos of 
dogfighting, which the government argued fell within the definition of the 
statute and was therefore a criminal act.196 Although dogfighting is criminal-
ized in all fifty states, and although the defendant’s action was undoubtedly 
illegal, the Court took issue with the fact that the statute did not account for 
the way different jurisdictions criminalize the same actions.197 As a case 
study, the Court looked to activities of hunters that while legal in one state, 
would be illegal under the statute.198 Thus, the Court found that the statute 
was overly broad, not based on defendant’s unlawful actions, but rather based 
on the potentially criminal actions of hunters.199 
Given that the overbreadth doctrine acts as an exception to jus tertii, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the application of the overbreadth doc-
trine operates as “strong medicine” to a statute.200 Because the overbreadth 
doctrine is “strong medicine” that can prove fatal to a statute, it is to be ad-
ministered cautiously.201 
One of the primary concerns with a statute that regulates protected 
speech is that it would cause a “chilling effect” on the protected speech.202 
The “chilling effect” occurs when there is legal reprisal—either through pros-
ecution or lawsuit—for an individual’s constitutionally protected speech, 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474–75 (describing the benefits of hunting). 
 196 See id. at 466 (detailing the respondent’s actions that led to him being indicted, and noting 
that dogfighting is illegal in fifty states). 
 197 See id. at 475–76 (describing how there are certain jurisdictions where hunting is legal and 
jurisdictions where hunting is illegal). 
 198 See id. (noting that hunting practices in one state could be illegal in another).  
 199 See id. at 482 (finding that the statute is limited as the government contends, and affirming 
the Third Circuit’s decision). 
 200 Broaderick, 403 U.S. at 613. 
 201 Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (quoting L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 
528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999)) (identifying the overbreadth doctrine as “strong medicine” not to be “cas-
ually employed”). Though the overbreadth doctrine is identified as “strong medicine,” this only 
serves to caution the court and does not prohibit the doctrine’s application because of the concerns 
that a statute regulating protected speech raises. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 484 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the court’s invalidation of § 48 was improper, and noting that the “strong medicine” 
of the overbreadth doctrine should be administered as a “last resort”). In contrast to Justice Alito’s 
dissent in Stevens, the majority did not even mention the “strong medicine” aspect of the over-
breadth doctrine when it reached the conclusion that § 48 was overly broad. See generally 559 
U.S. at 460–82 (majority opinion) (lacking a reference to “strong medicine”). 
 202 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (identifying the concerning “chilling effect” overly broad 
statutes can have on protected speech); STONE ET AL., supra note 168, at 136 (describing the po-
tential chilling effect that comes from concerns for vague statutes when the First Amendment is 
involved). 
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causing that individual to suppress their speech out of fear.203 In the eyes of 
the Court, the idea that protected speech would be chilled in any way is intol-
erable—hence the need for the overbreadth doctrine.204 
The overbreadth doctrine is an extremely potent facial challenge to a 
statute that regulates protected speech.205 As such, it is only administered in 
instances where a statute violates a “substantial” portion of protected 
speech.206 As Subsection Four regulates a form of protected speech, namely 
advocacy speech, and such regulation substantially infringes on protected 
speech, Subsection Four falls within the overbreadth doctrine’s ambit.207 
III. SUBSECTION FOUR IS OVERLY BROAD 
Under the Brandenburg standard, Subsection Four regulates protected 
speech and as such, it should be facially challenged under the First Amend-
ment as overbroad.208 Applying the overbreadth doctrine to Subsection Four 
makes clear that the statute’s reach is overly broad and that it criminalizes a 
substantial portion of protected advocacy speech.209 Furthermore, the statute 
cannot be remedied by a construction that could be applied in a “case-by-
case” basis as evident through the conflicting interpretations among the cir-
cuits.210 As such, the law should be declared unconstitutional, and it should be 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See STONE ET AL., supra note 168, at 136 (internal quotation omitted) (describing the 
concerns for vague statutes when the First Amendment is involved); Fallon, supra note 142, at 
861 n.48 (discussing the causes of the “chilling effect”). 
 204 See Fallon, supra note 142, at 867 (noting that it would be “intolerable” for there to be any 
chilling effect on protected speech); see also Igor Helman, Note, Spam-A-Lot: The States’ Cru-
sade Against Unsolicited E-mail in Light of the CAN-SPAM Act and the Overbreadth Doctrine, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 1525, 1547–48 (2009) (explaining the overbreadth doctrine and identifying three 
limitations). 
 205 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (quoting L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. at 39) (noting that the 
overbreadth doctrine as “strong medicine” that should not be “casually employed”). 
 206 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 (quoting Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.6) (noting 
that under the First Amendment overbreadth challenge, there needs to be a substantial number of 
applications whereby the statute is unconstitutional). 
 207 See infra notes 208–253 and accompanying text. 
 208 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 483–84 (Alito, J., dissenting) (identifying the 
overbreadth doctrine); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (establishing the standard 
used to determine if advocacy is a protected speech); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) 
(2012). 
 209 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Par-
ty, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)) (noting that under the First Amendment overbreadth challenge, 
there needs to be a “substantial number of . . . applications” whereby the statute is unconstitution-
al). 
 210 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1973) (discussing how an overbreadth 
issue can be remedied through a “case-by-case analysis”); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 
F.3d 461, 485 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that Subsection Four was overbroad); United States v. 
Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2014) (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s definition for “en-
courage”); DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2012) (adopting 
Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “encourage” excluding “help”); United States v. Tracy, 
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invalidated under the First Amendment.211 If Subsection Four is declared un-
constitutional, Congress would have a new opportunity to revise the stat-
ute.212 If given the opportunity, Congress should amend the subsection to in-
clude stronger language and specifically criminalize assisting immigrants 
with an “unremediable violation of immigration law or conduct that consti-
tutes fraud or a criminal violation.”213 
A. Subsection Four Regulates Protected Speech 
Part of the overbreadth analysis involves determining whether the 
speech is protected speech.214 As such, should a challenge to Subsection Four 
reach the Supreme Court, it is appropriate to apply the Brandenburg doctrine 
to determine if Subsection Four regulates protected speech.215 The statute 
                                                                                                                           
456 F. App’x 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that Subsection Four was not overbroad); United 
States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009) (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s defini-
tion of “encourage,” including “to help”); United States v. Yoshida, 303 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 
2002) (identifying “helping” as a possible definition for “encourage”); United States v. He, 245 
F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2001) (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “encourage,” in-
cluding “to help”). 
 211 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482 (holding that a law was overbroad, and invalid under the First 
Amendment). 
 212 See Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvert-
ence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 784 (2012) (discussing 
how the Supreme Court would use anticipatory overruling decisions by declaring statutes uncon-
stitutional, but give Congress a chance to fix them); Leon Friedman, Overruling the Court, AM. 
PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), http://prospect.org/article/overruling-court [https://perma.cc/2U5Z-
HG99] (arguing that Congress’s response to the Supreme Court’s dissatisfaction with its legisla-
tion is to amend and re-enact). 
 213 Brief for Amici Curiae, Sineneng-Smith, supra note 70, at 15 
 214 See Stevens, 599 U.S. at 469–72 (addressing whether the statute was regulating protected 
speech before analyzing whether it satisfied the overbreadth doctrine). 
 215 See id. (discussing whether the statute regulated protected speech). Although it may seem 
as though Subsection Four falls within the “integral to the crime” exception, it does not. See 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (establishing the exception). As 
noted by Stevens, a consideration as to whether speech is “integral to the crime,” is if the speech is 
“intrinsically related” to the illegal activity. See Stevens, 599 U.S. at 471 (noting that the “market 
for child pornography was ‘intrinsically related’ to the underlying abuse” (citing New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759, 761 (1982))). In contrast, a person encouraging an undocumented im-
migrant to come to the United States is not “intrinsically related” to people immigrating to the 
country illegally. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (regulating speech that encourages a person to 
come to the United States). Furthermore, the speech regulated by Subsection Four falls within the 
abstract advocacy of illegality. See id. (regulating encouraging speech); United States v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285, 298–99 (2008) (distinguishing integral-to-crime speech from advocacy speech). The 
example of advocacy speech provided by the Court in Williams was “I encourage you to obtain 
child pornography.” 553 U.S. at 300 (providing an example of advocacy speech). That would be 
akin to speech regulated by Subsection Four whereby the speaker would say “I encourage you to 
come to the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (regulating speech regarding encour-
aging undocumented immigrants to come to the United States). Thus, Brandenburg is the appro-
priate analysis. See 395 U.S. at 447–48 (establishing the test to determine whether advocacy 
speech is protected by the First Amendment). 
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provides that it is illegal to “encourage[] or induce[] an alien to come to, en-
ter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact 
that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.”216 
The use of the word “encourage” in the statute encompasses advocacy 
speech, because in order to encourage someone to act, the speech must advo-
cate for such action.217 Given that the statute regulates language that is advo-
cacy speech, it meets the first prong of the Brandenburg standard.218 Under 
the second prong of Brandenburg, an illegal activity must be imminent, and if 
speech satisfies this prong, then is not protected.219 As the statute stands, its 
“encourage” language also encompasses activities that are not imminent, as 
required by Hess.220 Because the statute fails to place any time qualifier be-
tween the encouragement and the alien entering into the United States, the 
statute fails to meet the second prong of the Brandenburg test, and thus the 
speech is protected.221 Finally, Subsection Four criminalizes speech regard-
less of whether the illegal activity is likely to happen, and thereby fails the 
third prong of the Brandenburg standard.222 There is no caveat within the 
statute that provides for the likelihood of someone entering into the United 
States in violation of the law.223 As such, the speech identified in Subsection 
                                                                                                                           
 216 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). 
 217 See id. (stating that it is illegal to “encourage”); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (forbidding 
the state from enacting laws that prohibit advocacy); see also Williams, 553 U.S. at 300 (providing 
“I encourage you to obtain child pornography” as an example of abstract advocacy speech). 
 218 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (noting that states are not allowed to enact laws that 
prohibit advocacy). 
 219 See id. at 447–48 (establishing that it is a violation of the First Amendment to prohibit 
advocacy unless such advocacy “incites imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action”). 
 220 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (prohibiting encouragement, but not specifying when such 
encouragement is illegal); see Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (describing the indefinite 
nature of Hess’s statement); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48 (establishing that it is a violation of 
the First Amendment to prohibit advocacy unless such advocacy incites “imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
 221 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (forbidding a person to encourage another to enter the 
United States, but not specifying when such encouragement would be illegal); Brandenburg, 395 
U.S. at 448 (establishing that it is a violation of the First Amendment to prohibit advocacy unless 
such advocacy incites “imminent lawless action”). 
 222 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (prohibiting a person to “encourage” another to come to 
the United Sates, but not identifying whether it is necessary for a person to come to the United 
States); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (establishing that it is a violation of the First Amendment to 
prohibit advocacy unless such advocacy “incites imminent lawless action and is likely to incite 
such action”). 
 223 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (making it illegal for a person to “encourage” another to 
enter the United Sates, but not identifying whether it is necessary for that person to actually come 
to the United States); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48 (establishing that it is a violation of the 
First Amendment to prohibit advocacy unless such advocacy incites “imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite such action”). 
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Four does not satisfy the Brandenburg standard, and thus is protected by the 
First Amendment.224 
B. Subsection Four Is Facially Overbroad 
An overbreadth analysis begins with construing the statute.225 The stat-
ute at issue here is not nearly as descriptive as the one that was upheld in 
United States v. Williams.226 The Court in Williams observed multiple factors 
within the statute, beginning with the scienter requirement.227 Although Sub-
section Four also has a scienter requirement, its requirement is distinguisha-
ble from the statute in Williams, which had scienter of “knowingly” at the 
beginning of the statute that applied to the rest of the statute.228 Here, the stat-
ute has both a “knowing” and “reckless disregard” scienter requirement in the 
middle of the statute.229 The statute in Williams also contained a bevy of op-
erative words, such as “advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits,” 
which the Court found to indicate the transactional connotation of the stat-
ute.230 In contrast, Subsection Four only has two operative words—
”encourage” and “induce”—both of which, given the different interpretations 
within the Circuits, are unclear and do not create any such connotation.231 
Furthermore, the Court in Williams was able to rely on a clear definition for 
“sexually explicit conduct,” and compare this definition to prior case law.232 
In contrast, Subsection Four does not provide a definition of “encourage,” 
                                                                                                                           
 224 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv); see Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (establishing the standard 
for advocacy speech to not be protected by the First Amendment). 
 225 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (noting that the first step in an overbreadth analysis is to 
construe the statute). 
 226 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (making it illegal to encourage an alien to come to 
the United States), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2012) (making it illegal to knowingly dis-
tribute material displaying a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct). 
 227 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293–97 (identifying various features of the statute). 
 228 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (containing the scienter requirement of “knowing-
ly”), with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (containing the scienter of “knowing” and “in reckless 
disregard of” but only applied to the status of the individual that was being encouraged). 
 229 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv); see infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text (discussing the 
lower level of intent conveyed by “in reckless disregard”). 
 230 Williams, 553 U.S. at 294. 
 231 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv); see Thum, 749 F.3d at 1147 (distinguishing from Yoshida to 
establish that “encourage” required action beyond escorting someone); DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 
248 (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “encourage”); Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1249 (in-
terpreting “encourage” to mean “to help”); He, 245 F.3d at 959 (interpreting “encourage” to mean 
“to help”). 
 232 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 296–97 (identifying the definition provided for “sexually explic-
itly conduct” and likening it to “sexual conduct” in the statute in Ferber). 
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and Circuit case law indicates that there is not a clear or consistent definition 
of the word.233 
Subsection Four also lacks any phrase that could place a limitation on 
the action it criminalizes, much like the statute in Stevens.234 In Stevens, the 
Court struck down a statute purporting to criminalize depicting animal cruelty 
because the statute did not require a showing that the conduct actually be cru-
el, and therefore it lacked boundaries.235 Subsection Four also places no limi-
tation on the general requirement of “encourage.”236 If Subsection Four could 
place a limiting factor on “encourage” to require an affirmative act on the part 
of the encourager, then the statute would not apply as broadly as it does.237 
For instance, if Subsection Four specified that the encouragement needed to 
be “active,” then perhaps this limiting factor would serve to tailor the statute 
enough to prevent an overbreadth finding.238 Despite this, there is presently 
no such limiting factor in Subsection Four, and as such it cannot stand.239 
After construing the statute, the next question is whether the statute pro-
hibits a substantial amount of protected speech.240 When a statute prohibits a 
substantial amount of protected speech, the “chilling effect” on such speech is 
                                                                                                                           
 233 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (providing no definition for “encourage”); see also 
Thum, 749 F.3d at 1147 (distinguishing from Yoshida to establish that “encourage” required action 
beyond escorting someone); DelRio-Mocci., 672 F.3d at 248 (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary’s 
definition of “encourage”); Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1249 (interpreting “encourage” to mean “to help”); 
Yoshida, 303 F.3d at 1150 (equating “encourage” with “help”); He, 245 F.3d at 959 (interpreting 
“encourage” to mean “to help”). In Williams, Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion also considered 
the legislative history as a potential source for a statutory construction. 553 U.S. at 307–08 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (discussing the legislative history of a statute that criminalized pandering 
child pornography). The language of Subsection Four stems from the Immigration Act of 1917, 
which also established a literacy test as a requirement to enter this country, and was later incorpo-
rated into the Immigration and Nationality Act. See infra notes 28–45 and accompanying text. 
Subsection Four would not have been included in the Immigration Reform and Control Act, but 
for being unceremoniously added back in shortly before its enactment. See infra note 58 (discuss-
ing how Subsection Four was added back in to IRCA). In sum, the legislative history offers little 
guidance regarding a potential construction. 
 234 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv); see Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474 (asserting that the requirement 
that the conduct be cruel would narrow the statute’s breadth). 
 235 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474 (noting that the breadth of the statute would be limited if the 
statute specified that the conduct needed to be cruel). 
 236 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
 237 See id. (beginning without any limiting factor on “encourage”); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474 
(noting that the breadth of the statute would be limited if the statute specified that the conduct 
needed to be cruel). 
 238 See DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 248 (emphasizing that the common sense meaning of en-
courage prompts someone to do something they would not otherwise have done (citing Lopez, 590 
F.3d at 1259 (Barkett, J., dissenting))). 
 239 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (beginning with “encourage” and no further indication 
that there is any limitation on this aspect). 
 240 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 297 (noting that after construing the statute, the next step is to 
determine if the statute prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech). 
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significant.241 In its current form, Subsection Four criminalizes certain com-
munications with non-citizen family members, communications related to 
advocacy for immigrants, and communications between employers and em-
ployees.242 In these scenarios, there is no requirement that the criminalized 
conduct is imminent, burdening a substantial amount of speech.243 As such, 
this “advocacy” speech fails to meet the Brandenburg standard and is there-
fore protected speech.244 
Subsection Four also “chills” this protected speech by putting a strain on 
family relationships, which can lead to disengagement from discussions about 
visiting or staying in the United States.245 Furthermore, Subsection Four 
serves to “chill” the speech between advocates and those immigrants coming 
to the United States.246 This impacts a wide breadth of people, from those 
who assist individuals in finding housing in the United States, to those who 
provide supplies to people crossing the border.247 Thus, the “chilling” effect 
                                                                                                                           
 241 See id. at 293 (identifying the concerning “chilling effect” overly broad statutes can have 
on protected speech); STONE ET AL., supra note 168, at 136 (describing the potential chilling ef-
fect that comes from concerns for vague statutes when the First Amendment is involved). 
 242 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 
2d 191, 197 (D. Mass. 2012) (exemplifying an instance when an employer was charged and con-
victed based on communications with an employee); see also Fallon, supra note 142, at 859–60, 
863 (identifying the overbreadth doctrine under the First Amendment as an exception to jus tertii, 
which allows a defendant to articulate situations where the law would violate the protected 
speech). An example that the Ninth Circuit found persuasive was a grandmother who asks her 
grandson to overstay his visa. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 483–84. 
 243 See Fallon, supra note 142, at 859–60, 863 (identifying the overbreadth doctrine under the 
First Amendment as an exception to jus tertii, which allows a defendant to articulate situations 
where the law would violate protected speech). 
 244 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv); see Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48 (establishing that it is 
a violation of the First Amendment to prohibit advocacy unless such advocacy incites “imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite such action”). 
 245 See Fallon, supra note 142 at 863 (noting that an exception to jus tertii is the overbreadth 
doctrine, and a defendant can assert the rights of a third-party not present in the court). 
 246 See id. (describing how the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to jus tertii, and thus 
allows a defendant to assert the rights of a third-party). 
 247 See, e.g., Piper Ehlen, HomeBase, Housing and Serving Undocumented Individuals and 
Families (2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/553bd8dfe4b06d949518334e/t/59b1809b
46c3c472328b7805/1504805070281/Undocumented+Immigrants+by+Piper+Ehlen.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TP9U-D8RU] (providing information regarding how undocumented immigrants can 
obtain housing); About No More Deaths, NO MORE DEATHS · NO MÁS MUERTES, http://forms.
nomoredeaths.org/about-no-more-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/QF7B-DMT7] (noting the work that 
No More Deaths does in the desert to assist immigrants crossing the border from Mexico to the 
United States); Ayuda a Mariposas Asegurar un Deposito Para su Propia Casa!, MARIPOSAS SIN 
FRONTERAS (June 22, 2017), https://mariposassinfronteras.org/ [https://perma.cc/D5ND-QE5] 
(discussing the work that Mariposas Sin Fronteras does with LGBTQIJ + immigrants, including 
finding housing); Border Water Drop, BORDER ANGELS, https://www.borderangels.org/desert-
water-drops/ [https://perma.cc/432G-ACMZ] (detailing the way that Border Angels leave gallons 
of water in the desert for immigrants); Humanitarian Respite Services, CATH. CHARITIES OF THE 
RIO GRANDE VALLEY, http://catholiccharitiesrgv.org/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/5D4B-B4E2] 
(noting that the Catholic Charities of the Rio Grande Valley provides refuge to immigrants at their 
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of Subsection Four has the potential to completely remove immigrant advo-
cacy in its entirety.248 
With respect to employment, the “chilling effect” has very real conse-
quences.249 Convicted defendants like Lorraine Henderson, who was arrested 
and found guilty under Subsection Four because she employed and advised 
an alien not to leave the United States, serve as a signal to people to not 
communicate with anyone they employ and suspect of being an illegal immi-
grant.250 If Henderson had not communicated with her employee at all, she 
likely would not have been arrested under Subsection Four.251 As such, allow-
ing the statute to stand could very likely chill communications between an 
employer and an employee.252 Given the high potential for Subsection Four to 
chill protected speech, Subsection Four violates the First Amendment, and it 
should be declared invalid under the overbreadth doctrine.253 Both the Ninth 
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have applied an overbreadth analysis to Sub-
section Four, and each reached different conclusions, with the Ninth Circuit 
finding that Subsection Four is overly broad and unconstitutional, and the 
Fourth Circuit finding the subsection constitutional.254 The Supreme Court 
should resolve these different conclusions and find that Subsection Four is 
overly broad, and thus unconstitutional.255 
                                                                                                                           
Respite center); Social Services, TAHIRIH JUST. CTR., https://www.tahirih.org/what-we-do/direct-
services/social-services/ [https://perma.cc/BV7L-U46U] (describing various social services that 
Tahirih Justice Center provides to immigrant women and girls fleeing violence); see also Fallon, 
supra note 142, at 863 (identifying the overbreadth doctrine under the First Amendment as an 
exception to jus tertii, which allows a defendant to articulate situations where the law would vio-
late the protected speech). 
 248 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (describing the “chilling effect”); STONE ET AL., supra note 
168, at 136 (describing the potential chilling effect that comes from concerns for vague statutes 
when the First Amendment is involved). 
 249 See, e.g., Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (describing Henderson’s criminal conduct as 
the discussions she had with the woman who cleaned her house, and the resulting conviction). 
 250 See id. at 196 (noting how Henderson advised Bitencourt against leaving the country). 
 251 See id. at 203–04 (describing and agreeing with the government’s argument that the advice 
Henderson provided to Bitencourt could constitute encouragement). 
 252 See STONE ET AL., supra note 168, at 136 (describing the potential chilling effect that 
comes from concerns for vague statutes when the First Amendment is involved). 
 253 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv); see, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474, 481–82 (applying an 
overbreadth analysis and finding that the statute was invalid under the First Amendment). 
 254 Compare Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485 (concluding that Subsection Four was unconsti-
tutional), with Tracy, 456 F. App’x 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that Subsection Four was not 
substantially overbroad). 
 255 See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.4, at 243 (10th ed. 
2013) (noting that the Supreme Court resolves different opinions between circuit courts in order to 
bring “uniformity”); REYNOLDS ROBERTSON & FRANCIS R. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 322, at 269 (Richard F. Wolfson & Philip B. Kurland 
eds., 2d ed. 1951) (noting that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in instances where differ-
ent courts of appeals reach different answers to the same legal question). 
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C. Potential Solutions 
Should the Supreme Court declare Subsection Four unconstitutional, 
Congress would have the opportunity to readdress the statute and find a way 
to make it constitutionally permissible.256 To avoid another overbreadth chal-
lenge to the statute, Congress must provide a replacement word with a clear 
definition.257 For instance, as opposed to “encourage” Congress could use 
“facilitate” or “urge” to capture the idea that an affirmative action is required, 
and avoid criminalizing protected speech.258 This stronger language would 
allow defendants, like Henderson, to be safe from prosecution.259 Hender-
son’s actions fell within the definition of “encourage,” but proving that her 
actions went so far as to constitute “urging” Bitencourt to reside in the coun-
try, or “facilitating” her residence, would not be a viable allegation.260 Hen-
derson advised Bitencourt against leaving the country, and such advisement 
would not rise to the level of actively “facilitating” or “urging” Bitencourt to 
stay.261 
In the amended statute, Congress should also provide an exception for 
those aliens to have an express remedy to their seemingly unlawful presence, 
to ensure that the statute does not infringe upon protected speech.262 One im-
portant aspect of the Brandenburg standard is that the advocacy must be for 
an unlawful action.263 As such, the exception should distinguish between fa-
cilitating and urging people who have immigration violations that can be 
remedied, and those whose violations cannot be remedied.264 There are cer-
                                                                                                                           
 256 See Friedman, supra note 212 (arguing that Congress’s response to the Supreme Court’s 
dissatisfaction with its legislation is to amend and re-enact). 
 257 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 296–97 (identifying the definition as a factor to consider in con-
struing a statute for the purposes of an overbreadth analysis). 
 258 See Facilitate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
facilitate [https://perma.cc/75E2-CADG] (defining “facilitate” as “to make easier: to help bring 
about”); Urge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/urge [https://
perma.cc/QJA7-ZFA2] (defining “urge” as “to present, advocate, or demand earnestly or pressing-
ly”). 
 259 See Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 197, 204 (describing Henderson’s six-day trial and jury 
conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)). 
 260 See id. at 204 (finding that Henderson’s actions did constitute “encouragement” but ex-
pressing discomfort with the flexibility of the statute). 
 261 See id. at 196 (describing Henderson’s conversation with Bitencourt, advising her not to 
leave the country). 
 262 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (establishing the standard); HUDSON, supra note 159, 
§ 3.5 (describing the large amount of protection that is given under the Brandenburg standard). 
 263 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; see Schwartz supra note 151 (parsing out the Brandenburg 
standard, and determining that it requires “(1) express advocacy of law violation; (2) the advocacy 
must call for immediate law violation; and (3) the immediate law violation must be likely to oc-
cur”). 
 264 See Brief for Amici Curiae, Sineneng-Smith, supra note 70, at 15 (arguing that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) should be constructed to distinguish between immigration cases that have a 
remedy and those that do not). 
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tain violations within immigration law for which there is no remedy, and this 
crucial lack of remedy erases a path to legal status in the United States.265 
Those who do not have a remedy within the United States would be commit-
ting an unlawful action simply by virtue of being present, and a defendant 
who communicates with such a person about their immigration status would 
also be inherently guilty of violating Subsection Four.266 In contrast, if a de-
fendant is urging or facilitating an individual whose actions can be remedied, 
then they are not necessarily advocating for an unlawful action.267 Drawing 
this distinction is less threatening to protected speech because it sharpens the 
understanding of the unlawful action.268 
This distinction could potentially allow defendants, like Henderson, 
some leeway in their expression and speech.269 Henderson had advised Biten-
court not to leave the country, and she sought immigration advice on behalf of 
Bitencourt.270 Though the court indicates that Henderson’s inquiry was un-
successful, that does not necessarily mean that Bitencourt’s case was entirely 
without remedy.271 If there was an exception for immigrants with a remedy, 
then Henderson could have potentially avoided her conviction as advising 
Bitencourt would not have been in violation of the law.272 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Subsection Four should be invalidated under the over-
breadth doctrine. Although Subsection Four has a long history within the 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See id. at 21 (identifying the instances when there is an unremediable immigration viola-
tion). For instance, falsely claiming citizenship is an unremediable violation. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(3)(D); see Brief for Amici Curiae, Sineneng-Smith, supra note 70, at 21 (noting that 
falsely claiming citizenship is an unremediable violation). 
 266 See Brief for Amici Curiae, Sineneng-Smith, supra note 70, at 20–21 (arguing that “in 
violation of the law” in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) should be interpreted to apply only to unremediable 
immigration violations). 
 267 See Facilitate, supra note 258 (defining “facilitate” as “to make easier: to help bring 
about”); Urge, supra note 258 (defining “urge” as “to present, advocate, or demand earnestly or 
pressingly”); see also Brief for Amici Curiae, Sineneng-Smith, supra note 70, at 20–21 (describing 
instances where there is an unremediable immigration solution). 
 268 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (establishing the standard to determine if speech is 
protected); Brief for Amici Curiae, Sineneng-Smith, supra note 70, at 20–21 (identifying instances 
when an immigrant’s case would be unremediable). 
 269 See Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (describing Henderson’s six-day jury trial and 
conviction). 
 270 See id. at 196 (noting how Henderson advised Bitencourt against leaving, and asked a co-
worker for advice regarding Bitencourt’s case). 
 271 See id. at 196–97 (describing Henderson asking her coworker about Bitencourt, and then 
her coworker asking a series of questions for Bitencourt to answer, and noting that after providing 
her co-worker with Bitencourt’s answers, the coworker advised Henderson that Bitencourt had no 
“meaningful prospect of adjusting her status”). 
 272 See id. at 197 (noting Henderson’s conviction). 
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United States, the use of the word “encourage” in the statute has proven prob-
lematic as five circuit courts have struggled to define “encourage,” and two 
circuit courts have disagreed regarding its constitutionality. Further, an appli-
cation of the Brandenburg standard reveals that Subsection Four regulates a 
substantial amount of protected speech, and as such the statute is in violation 
of the overbreadth doctrine. 
The amendments proposed above would allow defendants, like Hender-
son, to not live in fear of prosecution over hiring someone to clean their 
house. Also, since Subsection Four can make it illegal for an individual to 
discuss immigration consequences with members of their own family, and 
potentially prohibits counseling undocumented aliens, the changes to the stat-
ute would eliminate these injustices as well. Henderson’s case is unique be-
cause while the judge found that her actions could constitute encouragement, 
she was still entitled to a new trial and the prosecution ultimately dropped the 
charges against her. Although Henderson was allowed to go free, she lost five 
years of her life to this criminal charge, conviction, and appeal before the 
prosecution finally released her. Amending Subsection Four would prevent 
this unconstitutional injustice from happening again. 
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